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Central to Kant’s moral philosophy are the notions of autonomy and spontaneity, 
and their relation to reason and the understanding. Recent ‘constructivist’ 
readings of Kant’s ethics thus emphasise the role of the subject’s reflection in 
moral actions - reason is the only guarantor of the moral, and the right action must 
be worked out by the subject and consciously assented to. In contrast, for Fichte 
the moral is simply self-evident and immediately known to the subject. If Kant 
views the moral as requiring reflection and Fichte views the moral as immediate 
certainty, then it seems at first glance that the two are at loggerheads. Yet Fichte 
regarded himself as completing Kant’s Critical project by simply following 
through Kant’s thought to its fullest conclusions. Rather than dismissing Fichte’s 
claim to complete Kant’s philosophy, I suggest that paying close attention to 




In the first chapter I question Kant’s suggestion that a distinction between the thing in 
itself and appearances is helpful in moral matters. I suggest that Kant finds two modally 
distinct uses for the thing in itself, and that this is as problematic for Kant as it is for 
modern Kantians. Given that Kant’s appeal to the thing in itself is ill-suited to serve its 
purposes in securing his practical philosophy, in §2 I discuss some recent ‘constructivist’ 
interpretations of Kant’s ethics that attempt to do away with thing in itself whilst 
ostensibly salvaging the core insights of Kant’s moral theory. I suggest that constructivist 
interpretations tend to offer a corrupt account of the phenomenology of morality by 
ignoring its immediacy in experience. This is particularly unfortunate since it is 
something that Kant was at pains to integrate into his moral writings. Indeed, in departing 
from Kant’s careful insistence to preserve moral phenomenology I suggest the 
constructivists reveal their mis-reading of Kant’s moral project. In §3 I conclude with a 
discussion of Fichte’s ethics, focusing on his attempt to retain Kant’s focus on moral 
phenomenology, but without introducing the thing in itself. 
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§1: Intelligible Entities and Things in Themselves 
 
Consider Kant’s famous claim, the ‘positive’ side of the critical project (Bxxv), that only 
by introducing a distinction between the thing in itself and appearances can the 
appropriate (that is, non-dogmatic) space be made for the possibility of the freedom 
necessary for morality (Bxxvii-xxx, A532/B560-A558/B586). Kant’s claim and the 
argument to back it up both exploit the non-contradiction of the idea of freedom with 
strict causal determination, given transcendental idealism’s commitment to the distinction 
between appearances and the thing in itself. My query in this opening chapter, expressed 
broadly, concerns not the issue of non-contradiction between the idea of freedom and 
causal determination, but rather, the assumption of coherence between Kant’s claims 
regarding freedom and causality on the one hand, and on the other, transcendental 
idealism’s commitment to ‘the twofold meaning’ (Bxxvii) brought about by the 
appearance/thing in itself distinction – why should we think that a distinction between 
appearances and the thing in itself would help us in inquiries into moral matters?  
 
Since the bare bones of Kant’s thoughts on this matter are presented first in the Third 
Antinomy and then fleshed out with more detail in the further two Critiques and The 
Metaphysics of Morals (hereafter MM), I turn first to the relevant issues as they are 
addressed in the Third Antinomy
1
 and then look to the later works to see how Kant 
develops the idea. 
                                                 
1
 My exegesis of the Third Antimony draws heavily on the accounts offered by Allison (1990) and Bird 
(2006), and as such, ought to contain nothing controversial to readers familiar with the ‘two aspects/points 
of view’ interpretation of transcendental idealism. That is not to say that my argument assumes this reading 
to render Kant’s thought coherent, or that it is the correct interpretation. Rather, I hope that this opening 
chapter puts pressure on Kant whether we read him as providing an alternative to traditional 
metaphysics/ontology (see, eg, Allison (1990), Bird (2006)), or as closer to traditional 
metaphysics/ontology (eg, Ameriks (2000), diGiovanni (2005)). I bracket discussion of the broader 
(perhaps more interesting) question of the actual metaphysical and ontological commitments of 
transcendental idealism. 
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§1:i) The Third Antinomy: Exegesis 
 
The thesis and antithesis of the Third Antinomy respectively affirm and reject the 
possibility of our freedom, given the strict causal determination we find in our experience 
of nature, and to which Kant is apparently committed, by the Second Analogy.  
 
Thesis: Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only one from 
which all the appearances of the world can be derived. It is also necessary to 
assume another causality through freedom in order to explain them. 
(A444/B472) 
 
Antithesis: There is no freedom, but everything in the world happens solely in 
accordance with laws of nature. 
 (A445/B473) 
 
From the point of view of spatiotemporal appearances, causality is to be regarded as the 
schematized form of the necessary succession of events as in time (B233-4). If we 
consider our actions as exhausted by their description as spatiotemporal events and thus 
viewed within the chain of causality, then our actions must be determined by their 
preceding causes (A445/B473). This leaves no space for the assertion or logical 
coherence of a cause whose efficacy is not dependent of some prior one. Strict causal 
determination follows, which rules out the possibility of the relevant form of freedom 
which is conceived of transcendentally as the instigation of an absolute or spontaneous 
beginning to an ensuing causal chain. ‘Thus transcendental freedom is contrary to the 
causal law’ (A445/B474).  
 
Yet, this conclusion is counter-balanced by another point of view which maintains the 
necessity of precisely this idea of an absolute or spontaneous source of an ensuing causal 
chain. If such an idea is rejected there would be an endless series of explanatory causes 
for any single event: ‘If…everything happens according to mere laws of nature, 
then…there is…never a first beginning’ (A446/B474). If there is never a first beginning 
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then there would be ‘no completeness of the series on the side of the causes descending 
one from another’ (A446/B474). This would be an affront to the completeness of 
explanation, and leads to contradiction, since ‘the law of nature consists just in this, that 
nothing happens without a cause’ (A446/B474). So non–contradiction and completeness 
of explanation - indeed, the very acceptability of the antithetical claims regarding the 
natural world as we experience it - demand the idea of an absolute or spontaneous 
beginning to an ensuing causal chain. This just is to say that explanation demands the 
idea of transcendental freedom (A448/B476).  
 
On the face of it, the thesis and antithesis stand in irresolvable opposition to each other. 
As Allison succinctly sums up the problem: ‘the thesis and antithesis [can be] taken to 
claim, respectively, not everything takes place according to mechanistic causality and 
everything takes place according to natural causality’ (Allison (1990) p.14). Kant then 
goes on to ostensibly resolve the Antinomy by reference to transcendental idealism’s 
distinction between phenomena and the thing in itself.  
 
Recall that the categories only find their full legitimate application in appearances
2
 
(A147/B186-7, A236-7/B295-6), and that ‘phenomena’ is the generic term covering all 
appearances thought through the categories (A248-9) and thus rendered spatiotemporal. 
So, to say that the categories only have legitimate application in relation to appearances is 
just to say that they apply only to spatiotemporal phenomena. Recall also that ‘causality’ 
just is the schematized form of the representation of the necessary succession of events as 
in time (B233-4) which is to say, the relevant sensory representations have been 
organized by the understanding via the pertinent category. Causality then, qua 
schematized category, only finds legitimate application in relation to spatiotemporal 
phenomena, or, in general terms, to appearances.  
 
Recall also that we know from the Aesthetic that it makes no sense to say that anything is 
intrinsically or in itself spatiotemporal, since time and space just are the pure forms of 
                                                 
2
 Of course, the categories do have some residual, merely ‘logical significance’ (A147/B186) aside from 
sensation, but not of the kind that yields knowledge. See p.14-15 below. 
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intuition belonging to sensibility (inner and outer) (A42/B59). So whatever else we might 
say about the thing in itself, neither space nor time can be legitimately attributed to it. But 
note then, that if causality only finds legitimate application in relation to spatiotemporal 
phenomena, and the thing in itself, however construed, cannot, by definition, be 
legitimately attributed either spatial or temporal extension, that causality cannot have any 
legitimate application in relation to the thing in itself. 
 
Returning now to the Third Antinomy, and recalling that the antithesis maintained that 
strict causal determinism must be true because our actions must be determined by their 
preceding causes (A445/B473), we now see that this is true of our actions only if our 
actions are exhausted by their description as spatiotemporal events. Since causality is 
only applicable to spatiotemporal appearances, there is, logically at least, another 
contender to rival appearance’s claim to an exhaustive explanation of actions and events, 
namely, the thing in itself. But of course, this is to introduce an element of contingency 
regarding determinism which qua contingency is enough to make remove the logical 
contradiction between the idea of transcendental freedom and strict causal determinism. 
If causality only holds for appearances, even if it holds for all appearances, so long as 
there is no logical contradiction in postulating the idea of the thing in itself (whatever that 
might amount to) as well as phenomena, then there is no logical contradiction in 
postulating both the idea of freedom and determinism. The competing claims are, given 
transcendental idealism’s distinction between phenomena and the thing in itself, not 
logically incompatible. As Allison puts the point: “it becomes possible that both sides 
may be correct: the thesis, with its assertion of …[a] transcendentally free cause outside 
of experience; the antithesis, with its refusal to admit such a cause within experience’ 
(Allison (1990) p.23-4). So, a provisional model of the resolution sketched thus-far could 
be drawn up something like this: 
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Antinomy:   
 




i) strict causal determination <=> spatiotemporal phenomena/appearances 
   
ii)idea of transcendental freedom/spontaneity <=> idea of non-spatiotemporal  
thing in itself 
 
…so long as i) and ii) are (in some sense) distinct. 
 
In the Third Antinomy, Kant fleshes out the distinction between phenomena and the thing 
in itself in three ways. At A534/B562 he contrasts the animal power of choice: ‘arbitrium 
brutum’, with the human power of choice: ‘arbitrium sensitivum, yet…liberum’, stressing 
that though, like animals, humans are subject to sensuous impulses, unlike animals, we 
are not necessarily compelled or coerced by them – our actions may follow natural 
effects, but it is far from clear that our actions arise exclusively out of natural effects. 
Kant also exploits the contrast in our everyday language between actual occurrence – that 
which is – and moral judgement or prescription – that which ought to be (A547/B575-
A549/B577, A554/B582-A555-B583). I take it that the idea here is to bring about an 
awareness that our ordinary conception of obligation already presupposes, indeed 
requires, an appeal to the relevant idea of transcendental freedom or spontaneity. 
Postponing detailed discussion of this crucial ‘is/ought’ distinction for later, the 
discussion which I want to focus on here, and which runs almost right through the formal 
resolution, relies on a distinction between the empirical (which we might just call the 
spatiotemporal) and the intelligible. Briefly, I suggest that since the intelligible does not 
seem to be strictly reducible to or identifiable with either phenomena or the thing in 
itself, it is not clear why the distinction between phenomena and the thing in itself gives 
us insight or help in moral matters.   
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§1:ii) Intelligible Entities 
 
The terminology ‘intelligible entities’ is not Kant’s, but I use it to bracket together the 
various uses and applications of ‘the intelligible’ that Kant employs in the Antinomy: 
intelligible cause/causality (A537/B565, A544/B572); intelligible object (A538/B566); 
intelligible faculty (A545/B573); intelligible ground (A545/B573) and intelligible 
character (A541/B569). As I see it, although Kant runs them together, there are two 
distinct lines of discussion employed in the Antinomy regarding intelligible entities. The 
first is found at A537/B565-A541/B569, in which the thing in itself is operative in 
resolving the antinomy by making the relevant space for intelligible entities, whereas in 
the second discussion found at A551/B579-A554-B582, reason seems to do that work. I 
address the latter discussion first. 
 
The latter discussion begins by inviting the reader to suppose that reason were to have 
transcendental freedom, ie the capacity to instigate an ensuing causal chain, and that the 
ensuing chain would be spatiotemporal. ‘[R]eason’s action then could be called 
free…[and] the empirical character [would be]…determined in the intelligible character’ 
(A551/B579).  The potential problem facing this hypothetical scenario, namely, that we 
are not acquainted with the intelligible, but only with the empirical/spatiotemporal, is met 
with the observation that the intelligible is at least ‘indicated through appearances’ 
(A551/B579). Presumably Kant has in mind here something like the ‘ought/is’ distinction 
mentioned at A547/B575-A549/B577 to back up this claim – if the empirical is exhausted 
by the ‘is’, then, it is presumed, the ‘ought’ which we encounter in experience must have 
its locus in some other arena. To the further problem of how it could be that, given strict 
causal determination of the spatiotemporal, reason could conceivably be such that it 
could usher in an absolute beginning to an empirical causal chain, the now familiar 
answer is offered:  
 
…if reason can have causality in regard to appearances…reason is not sensible… 
[and] there takes place here what we did not find in any empirical series: that the 
condition of a successive series of occurrences could itself be empirically 
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unconditioned. For here the condition is outside the series of appearances (in the 
intelligible) and hence not subject to any sensible condition or to any 
determination of time through any passing cause… [Yet] the very same cause in 
another relation also belongs to the series of appearances. 
 (A552/B580) 
 
That is, for reason to be transcendentally free, it would have to be ‘a mere intelligible 
faculty’ that as such, would ‘not be subject to the form of time, and hence not subject to 
the conditions of temporal sequence’ (A551/B579). Thus, if reason were to be 
transcendentally free yet causally efficacious in time and space, we would have to ascribe 
to the human being both an empirical and intelligible character, such that ‘[r]eason is thus 
the persisting condition of all voluntary actions under which the human being appears’ 
(A553/B581). Further, the empirical character would have to be considered the ‘sensible 
schema’ (A553/B581) of the intelligible, and ‘every [empirical] action, irrespective of the 
temporal relation in which it stands to other appearances, [as] the immediate effect of the 
intelligible character of pure reason’ (A553/B581). We may summarize that the two 
important intelligible entities at play here are ‘intelligible character’, which makes 
possible the idea of ‘intelligent causality’, and that here both are accommodated by the 
non-empirical status of reason (A551/B579). That is, given that the empirical is 
exhausted by the ‘is’, the ‘ought’ is accommodated by intelligible entities, the locus of 
which, at A553/B581 is identified as reason. 
 
Note then, that if we were to draw up a similar model as before for this discussion, 
reason’s intelligible entities would play the operative role in enabling the resolution of 
the Antinomy, and not the thing in itself: 
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The ‘reason’ model of the Antinomy:   
 




i) strict causal determination <=> empirical character viewed from standpoint of 
spatiotemporal phenomena/appearances 
   
ii)idea of transcendental freedom/spontaneity <=> idea of intelligible entities viewed 
from standpoint of non-
spatiotemporal REASON. 
 
…so long as i) and ii) are (in some sense) distinct. 
 
The key stages of the other, earlier, discussion of intelligible entities at A537/B565-
A541/B569 run much the same as they do in the later one just rehearsed, but with the one 
important difference that there, the intelligible is viewed from the standpoint of the thing 
in itself, rather than from reason. Again, we learn that an intelligible cause would have to 
be ‘outside the series’ of spatiotemporal, empirical conditions, whilst its effects could 
only be ‘encountered in the series’ (A537/B565). And again too, we can attribute 
transcendental freedom only if we consider both an empirical and intelligible character 
(A539/B567), though here: 
 
The first [empirical character] one could call the character of such a thing in 
appearance, the second its character as a thing in itself. 
 (A539/B567, my emphasis) 
 
And of course this yields the following model: 
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The ‘thing in itself’ model of the Antinomy:   
 




i) strict causal determination <=> empirical character viewed from standpoint of 
spatiotemporal phenomena/appearances 
   
ii)idea of transcendental freedom/spontaneity <=> idea of intelligible entities viewed 
from standpoint of non-
spatiotemporal THING IN ITSELF. 
 
…so long as i) and ii) are (in some sense) distinct. 
 
It seems clear that Kant (and with him Allison and Bird too) does not feel this distinction 
troubling enough to be worthy of serious comment. Within the discussion of the 
resolution, reason and the thing in itself are, if not conflated, at least seen as un-
problematically interchangeable at stage ii) of the last two of the above models of the 
Antinomy. Yet it is an important distinction to make. On the ‘reason’ model, the relevant 
distinction that enables the possibility of the freedom necessary for morality is the 
distinction between spatiotemporal appearances and the faculty of reason, whereas it is 
the distinction between the thing in itself and spatiotemporal appearances that does this 
work on the model immediately above. And this raises the following question: given that 
it seems sufficient for the possibility of the freedom necessary for morality to contrast 
phenomena with reason (from the ‘reason model’ offered at A551/B579-A554-B582), 
why do we also need to contrast phenomena with the thing in itself? Or, to put it another 
way, why should we think that a distinction between phenomena and the thing in itself 
would help us in inquiries into moral matters, since it seems the distinction between 
phenomena and reason will suffice?  
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§1:iii) Things in Themselves 
 
I take it that the two most pressing answers to the question just posed would be 
something like:  
i) perhaps it is too much to equate reason with the thing in itself or to use them 
interchangeably in the resolution to the Third Antinomy, but reason at least shares certain 
important theoretical attributes with the thing in itself, such as the conceptualizability of 
‘being outside of’ the spatiotemporal series (in the sense discussed above). In this sense, 
the thing in itself serves the theoretical purpose of revealing to us otherwise opaque 
distinctions about reason. In short, the thing in itself and reason are suitably close in 
important theoretical respects, so that the comparison, if not the conflation, of the two 
yields a theoretical bounty, of which, the discussion found in the resolution of the Third 
Antinomy stands as a prime example.  
ii) the first, ‘thing in itself’ discussion at A537/B565-A541/B569 should be 
viewed as an extremely abstract discussion, such that lays down the necessary logical 
conditions for any thing to be transcendentally free. The later ‘reason’ discussion at 
A551/B579-A554-B582 ought then to be read as a more specific discussion, laying down 
the necessary conditions for an intellect such as ours to be transcendentally free. The first, 
‘thing in itself’ discussion would then establish what is necessary for transcendental 
freedom generally, and in the second, ‘reason’ discussion those findings are 
hypothetically applied to a particular example, namely, human beings. 
 
With these two responses in mind I turn to a discussion of the thing in itself, and suggest 
that Kant simultaneously runs two modally distinct uses of the thing in itself and that this 
is problematic because these two uses pull in opposite, indeed, irreconcilable directions. 
The result is that once again we are left asking why the distinction between phenomena 
and the thing in itself is helpful in moral matters.   
 
An excellent appraisal of this issue, highlighting the divergent uses to which Kant puts 





. In contrasting the role of the thing in itself in the first two 
Antinomies with the use to which it is put in the Third, diGiovanni clearly elucidates 
Kant’s distinct and incompatible conceptions of the thing in itself (diGiovanni (2005) 
p.153-5). Consider the First Antinomy, the crucial tension of which can be summarized 
as whether or not the world has a beginning in time and spatial limits (A426/B454, 
A427/B455). As in the Third Antinomy, the resolution of the First turns on the ideality, 
and thus limited scope of the spatiotemporal. Since things in themselves by definition are 
not intuitable, they cannot be schematized and so neither space nor time is legitimately 
attributable to them. Yet in the First Antinomy this now familiar line is put to work not to 
reveal the merit in each of the respective theses (as it is in the Third), but rather, to bring 
about an awareness that the questions raised by the thesis and antithesis are simply empty 
of meaning. The validity of the two opposing theses of the First Antinomy is denied by 
the invocation of critical ignorance: if the spatiotemporal is ideal, then to be 
spatiotemporal just means not to have any intrinsic spatial or temporal extension (recall 
A42/B59 and p.8 above), but rather means that such limits depend on an external 
observer. So to ask about the absolute spatiotemporal character of anything is to 
misunderstand the parameters of meaningful inquiry for finite rational beings such as 
ourselves. Things in themselves are such that we could not possibly know them, and so in 
response to the sort of questions raised in the First Antinomy, ‘one can answer that the 
question itself is nothing, because no object for the question is given’ (A479/B507n). 
 
Thus we cannot evade the obligation of giving at least a critical resolution of the 
questions of reason before us by lamenting the narrow limits of our reason and 
confessing, with the appearance of a modest self knowledge that [they] lie beyond 
our reason … For each of these questions concerns an object that can be given 
nowhere but in our thoughts 
 (A481/B509) 
 
                                                 
3
 I draw heavily on diGiovanni (2005) in this section. I am greatly indebted to his discussion. His insight 
into the contrary uses to which Kant employs the thing in itself forms the bedrock for my ensuing 
discussion of the inappropriateness of the thing in itself as locus for intelligible entities. 
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The thought that underwrites the resolution of the First Antinomy thus seems to be 
something like: the idea of the thing in itself stands in contradistinction to our experience, 
and so makes possible the comprehension of the limits of reason, and thereby also, the 
limits of our sphere of meaning. To briefly address Kant’s theory of meaning, for Kant, 
when we get the full picture of schematised categories enabling successful, unified 
experience of objects, those concepts have full ‘determinate’ meaning [Bedeutung] 
(A245). This point’s importance warrants explicit statement: fully determinate meaning 
for a priori concepts in experience is dependent upon their combination with intuition in 
the formation of judgements about objects (B298). Though Kant’s most detailed 
discussions of ‘meaning’ appear in the Refutation, Schematism and Phenomena and 
Noumena chapters (see especially B186-7, A244-5, B298, and B303-5) perhaps the 
clearest way to bring out Kant’s position is by reference to his famous comment: 
‘Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none 
would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are 
blind’ (A51/B75). Kant’s position regarding ‘meaning’ is simply an extension of this 
thought. The categories have significant use only insofar as they are related to possible 
experience, otherwise they are simply ‘empty of content’ (B298). Full determinate 
meaning for concepts is found only when sensibility and understanding come together to 
make right the respective deficiencies of blindness and emptiness, enabling possible 
experience of objects in space (B186). The further thought is that though it still makes 
sense to talk of the pure, unschematised categories aside from their role in determinate 
fully meaningful judgements, such utterances would be ‘empty’, finding only a negligible 
‘logical’ or ‘functional’ meaning (B186-7). Thus to speak of the thing in itself in 
categorial terminology is not meaningless in the sense that such talk of the thing in itself 
is not gobbledygook. That is, we understand the way such terms might be related 
‘functionally’ or ‘logically’, and it is for that reason that such talk does not strike us as 
sheer gibberish. Nonetheless, there is another sense in which, for Kant, such talk is 
meaningless – lacking ‘content’ such talk is vacuous since it is ultimately empty4. Such 
talk lacks the sort of meaning that is valuable to us as human knowers, ie, full 
                                                 
4
 See Kant’s own example of the ‘great wind’ that surrounds ‘metaphysically-great men’ (Prolegomena, 
373n). 
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determinate meaning. So whilst phenomena can be said to have full meaning for us, the 
thing in itself thus conceived can have at best only a logical significance, empty of 
meaning, and thereby stands to delineate the limits of possible knowledge and legitimate 
inference for a finite consciousness such as ours. Turning to diGiovanni:  
 
[w]hether the cosmos is infinitely extended in space or has spatial limits, or again, 
whether it has existed for an infinite period of time or has rather a beginning in 
time, are questions that Kant claims cannot be answered, not because we have no 
sufficient knowledge for dealing with them, but because they are in principle 
unanswerable. They are meaningless.’  
(diGiovanni (2005) p.154-5). 
 
In contrast, in the Third Antinomy the idea of the thing in itself makes possible the idea 
of transcendental freedom, given strict causal determination of the spatiotemporal. And 
diGiovanni is correct to point out that these are distinct notions and applications of the 
thing in itself – the thing in itself is being put to work to do two very different jobs. In the 
First Antinomy what is made possible by the introduction of the idea of the thing in itself 
is an awareness of the limits of the sphere of meaning for finite consciousness, whereas in 
the Third, what is made possible is the idea of a spontaneous beginning of an ensuing 
causal chain. Yet this raises the question, if for beings like us, the meaning ‘buck’ stops 
within appearances, and, if causality falls squarely within that sphere or space of meaning 
(from the Schematism and the Second Analogy), what would the postulation of a 
causality aside from appearances amount to?   
 
It is important to note that the first two Antinomies are formally distinguished from the 
latter two as mathematical, not dynamical, and so we should not expect the same form of 
resolution for the two different forms of antinomy
5
. Yet diGiovanni’s insight is still an 
                                                 
5
 diGiovanni himself deals with this issue not under the narrow parameters of the forms of antinomy, but 
amongst the broader topic of the (mis)match within the Critical project’s elucidation of ‘intentional 
activities’ (diGiovanni (2005) p.160). Thus, ‘[g]ranted Kant’s purely formal conception of reason, there is 
still a conceptual obligation to define how the two sets of intentional activities in which reason engages (the 
practical and the theoretical) relate to one another and respect each other’s boundaries within the same 
mental universe’ (diGiovanni (2005) p.161-2). Whilst I will ultimately argue for a similar position 
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apt one - the core of the issue here is precisely that there are two different types of 
antinomy at play here, and that each finds a distinct form of resolution in the thing in 
itself. Since the thing in itself performs two different roles in resolving the two different 
forms of antinomy, the pressing question is whether these two different jobs can co-exist 
in the same construct. That is, can the thing in itself be coherently conceived as 
performing both roles? 
 
I mean here not simply to repeat the old suggestion that it is only by an equivocation in 
the use of the term ‘causality’ (ie intelligible vs. empirical) that the Third Antinomy is 
resolved
6
. I mean to go further and suggest that if, as the resolution to the First Antinomy 
suggests, the limit of our sphere of meaning is marked by the thing in itself, then from the 
point of view of the thing in itself there must simply be an empty, blind IS, void of 
meaning – recall the criteria for emptiness and blindness at A51/B75. And of course from 
that point of view, it is not only causality that finds illegitimate application, but, crucially, 
the all-important OUGHT of the Third Antinomy’s intelligible entities must surely also 
be condemned to the same fate. That is, the strength of the ‘ought’, as distinct from the 
‘is’, lies precisely in the fact that it is thoroughly saturated with meaning, not void of it. 
So, if the foregoing is correct, and at least at some points (eg the First Antinomy) Kant’s 
conception of the thing in itself delineates the boundaries of our sphere of meaning, ie, 
that there is only a blind is from the point of view of the thing in itself, then the required 
‘ought’ of the Third Antinomy’s intelligible entities, cannot be coherently viewed from 
that blind ‘is’ point of view. Indeed, we might say that Kant is disingenuous in suggesting 
that the contrast between the thing in itself and phenomena ushers in a ‘twofold meaning’ 
(Bxxvii, and p.4 above) for the Critical philosophy. Rather, the lesson of the First 
                                                                                                                                                 
regarding the mismatch of theoretical and practical reason, diGiovanni’s particular framing of the issue 
seems inseparable from his wider stance regarding the metaphysical/ontological commitments of 
transcendental idealism, a topic I have postponed for a later paper. Thus, I have here chosen to limit my 
discussion to the forms of antinomy and the respective uses found for the thing in itself, and will follow a 
‘metaphysically neutral’ path toward a discussion of the wider mismatch of Kant’s use of theoretical and 
practical reason. 
6
 See eg Paton (1946), and Allison (1986) p.398 (though Allison later retracted the accusation of an 
unjustified equivocation from spatiotemporal causality to freedom – see Allison (1990), p.244, and 
especially p.244n25). See also Wood “Kant’s Compatibilism” in Wood (1984) p.73-101, esp p.87-9 for a 
defence of Kant.  
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Antinomy is that the thing in itself and meaning are modally distinct. Returning again to 
diGiovanni:  
 
Kant was saying that from that standpoint [of the thing in itself] all the 
distinctions that define rationality no longer hold... It is to imply…that the fiction 
of assuming the standpoint of the thing in itself is just a rhetorical device, since 
the concept of ‘knowledge’ no longer applies from that standpoint.”  
(diGiovanni (2005) p.20). 
 
With diGiovanni’s insight now in view, we see just how ill-suited the thing in itself is to 
accommodate intelligible entities. Recall from the preceding discussion that Kant claimed 
the intelligible entities cannot be coherently conceived of from the point of the view of 
phenomena. Now though, it seems that if intelligible entities can be coherently conceived 
of from the point of view of the thing in itself at all, they can do so only by virtue of an 
equivocation in the conception and application of the thing in itself. Since intelligible 
entities - qua intelligible - find no place whatsoever in the blind ‘is’ outside of, or perhaps 
better, aside from our sphere of meaning, then if we are to retain the link between 
intelligible entities and the thing in itself, we must surely be forced to conceive of two 
modally distinct viewpoints of the thing in itself: the first being the blind ‘is’; the other a 
viewpoint from which deterministic spatiotemporal appearances can be contrasted, such 
that makes possible the idea of transcendental freedom necessary for morality, but that is 
distinct from the blind is. More, this point of view is, as necessary for the possibility of 
morality, saturated with, rather than empty of meaning. Returning to the discussion of the 
Third Antinomy’s use of the ‘ought/is’ distinction (A547/B575-A549/B577; A554/B582-
A555/B583, and above, p.8), we can now comment that even if we admit, with Kant, that 
the ‘ought’ we find in moral experience cannot be accommodated by the empirical, it is 
not clear that Kant has found an unproblematic locus for it in the thing in itself. Kant is 
employing the thing in itself in two very different capacities, and it is far from clear that 
the two could match up. We might draw up a model of the present issue as: 
  
i)Thing in itself ==> blind ‘is’ beyond, or aside from human sphere of meaning 
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ii)Thing in itself ==>sphere of non-spatiotemporal meaning within which fall the 
intelligible entities necessary for the idea of transcendental 
freedom. 
 
If the foregoing is correct, then it seems that either we must accept an incoherence within 
the critical project, given an unpalatable equivocation in Kant’s use of the thing in itself – 
conceived of at some points as entirely void of meaning, and at others, as saturated with 
meaning – or we might want to make the following, three-fold distinction regarding the 
thing in itself, intelligible entities and appearances, rather than the two-fold one that Kant 
makes: 
 
i)Thing in itself ==> blind is, beyond, or aside from sphere of human meaning 
 
ii)Appearances ==> spatiotemporal phenomena 
 
iii)Intelligible Entities ==> not phenomena, since not spatiotemporal, yet not the 
thing itself either, since saturated with human 
meaning. 
 
Now, if we make this three-fold distinction and divorce intelligible entities from the thing 
in itself, and we recall that on the ‘reason’ model of the Antinomy outlined above it was 
not necessary to include the thing in itself in order to display its formal resolution, we are 
again faced with the question, why would we think that a distinction between the thing in 
itself and phenomena would help us with moral matters? Note though that the point now 
is not only that reason can also play that role, but further, that since intelligible entities 
seem not to fit squarely with the use Kant finds for the thing in itself in other places, yet 
they do seem to fit squarely within the use he finds for reason, that the ‘reason’ model 
seems a better fit for intelligible entities than the ‘thing in itself’ model. Consequently, 
Kant’s distinction between the thing in itself and phenomena looks ever-more redundant, 
indeed, even unnecessary for the possibility of morality. We then seem to have increasing 
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cause to ask: if the distinction between human reason and phenomena will not only do the 
required work in enabling the non-contradictory conceptualization of the idea of 
transcendental freedom, but seems to do it better than (that is, less problematically than) 
the idea of the thing in itself, then why do we need to include the thing in itself in our 
moral theory at all? 
 
With the above three-fold distinction between the thing in itself, phenomena and 
intelligible entities in mind, we can address the two points presented earlier, each of 
which defended Kant’s use of the thing in itself. Recall the first suggestion, that the thing 
in itself and reason are suitably close in important theoretical respects, so that the 
comparison, if not the conflation, of the two yields a theoretical bounty, of which, the 
discussion found in the resolution of the Third Antinomy stands as a prime example. To 
this it is surely sufficient to reply that whatever the bounty might be within Kant’s 
theoretical enterprise, with regard to his moral project, from the foregoing it is clear that 
the distinction between reason and phenomena does the necessary work better than that  
between the thing in itself and phenomena. Thus, at least with regard to the possibility of 
transcendental freedom relevant to his moral project, we can answer that the bounty is 
still reaped, nay, yields a better crop without the thing in itself. And of course, this brings 
us back yet again to the question: why then would we think that the distinction between 
the thing in itself and phenomena is of use to us in moral matters? 
 
Recall also the second suggestion, that the discussion of the resolution found at 
A537/B565-A541/B569, from which the ‘thing in itself’ model was sketched, establishes 
what is necessary for transcendental freedom generally, and in the second, ‘reason’ 
discussion at A551/B579-A554-B582 those findings are hypothetically applied to a 
particular example, namely, human beings. The idea is that the invocation of the thing in 
itself is justified since it establishes the abstract logical conditions for freedom. To this, 
we can similarly reply that the operative distinction here is more fittingly made by the 
counterpoising of reason and appearances, since the ‘reason’ model better accommodates 
intelligible entities for the reasons already discussed. Yet we can also make a further 
comment, itself an extension of that thought. If it is correct to understand the idea of the 
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thing in itself as the idea of the blind ‘is’ that delineates the boundaries of meaning, then 
if Kant were to be attributing transcendental freedom to a thing aside from our experience 
of it, would he not be transgressing the limits of his own system? Surely the lesson of 
transcendental idealism’s distinction between phenomena and the thing in itself is that 
aside from our experience of them, things simply have no intrinsic meaning. Now since 
freedom falls squarely within the sphere of meaning, and meaning is relative to possible 
human experience, then to the question of the intrinsic, absolute freedom of a thing aside 
from possible human experience, we are surely entitled to reply: ‘the question itself is 
nothing, because no object for the question is given’ (A479/B507n). Is any other 
response, the resolution of the Third Antinomy included, not to ascribe meaning beyond 
the sphere of the meaningful? Indeed, if the idea of freedom itself falls so squarely within 
the sphere of human meaning, then what sense is there to be made of the idea of the 
freedom of a thing in itself?  
 
Before moving on to consider some possible objections to this line of thought, I want to 
make good on the promise made earlier and look at how these issues play out in Kant’s 





                                                 
7
 Of course it ought to be noted that the issue at stake in the Third Antinomy is that of transcendental 
freedom – namely the instigation of an absolute or spontaneous beginning to an ensuing chain – whilst the 
issue principally at stake in the moral works is more often practical freedom – that is, the absence of 
necessitation by sensuous impulse. Yet since my argument focuses on the role and application of the thing 
in itself in discussions of both transcendental and practical freedom, I take it to be unproblematic to move 
from a discussion of the Third Antinomy to the later works. 
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Towards the end of Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (hereafter, Gr), in part III, 
Kant rehearses the central themes of the Third Antinomy, contrasting appearances with 
the thing in itself, such that we are invited to conceive of ‘a distinction, although a crude 
one, between a world of sense and the world of understanding’ (Gr 4:451). Further, there 
is explicit emphasis laid on the idea that these two ‘worlds’, or perhaps better, 
‘standpoints’ (Gr 4:452) must be conceived of as meeting in the practical actions of 
finitely conscious agents such as ourselves (Gr 4:456). As we will see, within Gr Kant 
clearly thinks that it is the distinction between the thing in itself and appearances that 
makes the space necessary for morality – but since this entails conceiving of the 
standpoint of the thing in itself as inundated with meaning, it is problematic, for the 
reasons just discussed.  
 
The discussion at Gr 4:451 begins with consideration of the empirical representations of 
the self yielded from inner sense, which offer only a partial insight into the self, namely, 
the self as appearance. ‘Even as to himself, the human being cannot cognize what he is in 
himself through the cognizance he has by inner sensation’ (Gr 4:451). Aware of the 
limited nature of this insight, the subject ‘must necessarily assume something else lying 
at their basis, namely his ego as it may be constituted in itself’ (Gr 4:451, my emphasis). 
This then yields the familiar picture of the two standpoints, here explicitly conceived of 
as standpoints from which we can view the subject: 
 
…as regards mere perception and receptivity to sensations he must count himself 
as belonging to the world of sense, but with regard to what there may be of pure 
activity in him (what reaches consciousness immediately and not through 





With this conception of the subject at play, Kant then forms his model of free agency: 
 
…he has two standpoints from which he can regard himself and cognize laws for 
the use of his powers and consequently for all his actions; first, insofar as he 
belongs to the world of sense, under laws of nature (heteronomy); second, as 
belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which, being independent of nature 
are not empirical but grounded merely in reason. 
(Gr 4:452) 
 
Note then that in Gr it is the conception of the I in itself that opens the door to the 
intelligible, ie, here Kant employs the ‘thing in itself model’ (rather than the ‘reason 
model’) as a way of accounting for free agency. The distinction between appearances and 
the thing (I) in itself enables the conceptualization of the intelligible entities necessary for 
the possibility of morality, which is to say that it is from the standpoint of the I in itself 
that the ‘ought’ is brought to the table. As such, the standpoint of the thing in itself, as 
used here, must be conceived of as a standpoint that is swamped with meaning, which, as 
we have seen, raises concerns regarding the overall coherence of the critical project, since 
in other places the standpoint of the thing in itself is conceived of instead as a standpoint 
entirely incapable of accommodating of meaning.  
 
§1:iv.ii) The Critique of Practical Reason 
 
Within The Critique of Practical Reason (hereafter, C.Pract.R). there are passages that 
clearly endorse at least some variant of ‘the thing in itself model’, most notably in a 
footnote at p.5/109 where Kant practically recites the same discussion just elucidated in 
Gr regarding the necessity of conceiving of the self in itself, and at p.105/231 where Kant 
comments that ‘if we were capable of…an intellectual intuition…we should perceive that 
this entire chain of appearances in regard to all that concerns the moral laws depends on 
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the spontaneity of the subject as a thing in itself’8. Yet there are also a number of relevant 
discussions that bear a far greater resemblance to the ‘reason model’, where the pivotal 
distinction that makes the possible space for morality is that between sensible 
appearances and a non-sensible, intelligible ‘world’ given through reason, without the 
invocation of the thing in itself. Indeed, the common characterization of the principle aim 
of the second Critique is to demonstrate that reason has the capacity to sufficiently 
determine action ie, to show that pure practical reason alone can be moral. Thus the thing 
in itself finds no place in the initial formulation of the second Critique’s central question 
as posed in the introduction: ‘whether pure practical reason of itself suffices to determine 
the will’ (p.15/120), nor does it figure in many of the statements of the answer this 
question finds. That is, we are frequently reminded that it is reason that determines moral 
actions, once we allow the invocation of the now-familiar intelligible or ‘supersensible’ 
entities. And in many of these discussions there is no reference to the thing itself (eg 
p.24/134, p.31/142, p.34/145). Thus the three-fold model for understanding Kant’s moral 
picture suggested above – that of the distinct status of the thing in itself, appearances and 
intelligible entities  - seems accommodated, even if only perhaps unintentionally, by 
C.Pract.R.  
 
…the moral law…gives us a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the 
sensible world, and the whole compass of our theoretical use of reason, a fact 
which points to a pure world of the understanding… 
This law (as far as rational beings are concerned) gives to the world of sense, 
which is a sensible system of nature, the form of a world of the understanding, 
that is, of a supersensible system of nature… [which] we might call…the 
archetypal world (natura archetypa), which we only know in reason 
 (C.Pract.R. p.44/156-7, my emphasis)  
 
                                                 
8
  See also p.5/109 and p.122-3/252, where Kant invokes the idea of the self as ‘noumenon in a world of the 
understanding’, conflating the intelligible with the noumenal, if not the thing in itself (see also p.50/164-5). 
I postpone discussion of what significance a distinction between noumena and the thing in itself actually 
amounts to for later, when I address Kantian replies. 
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I know myself on the one side to be an intelligible being determined by the moral 
law (by means of freedom), and on the other side as acting in the world of sense. 
It is the concept of freedom alone that enables us to find the unconditioned and 
intelligible for the conditioned and sensible without going out of ourselves. For it 
is our own reason that by means of the supreme and unconditional practical law 
knows that itself and the being that is conscious of this law (our own person) 
belong to a pure world of understanding, and moreover defines the manner in 
which, as such it can be active.   
(C.Pract.R. p.112/238-9, my emphasis) 
 
Further, C.Pract.R. also clearly contains the thought, later made more explicit in the third 
Critique, that what was above referred to as ‘the sphere of meaning’ is relative only to a 
finitely rational consciousness such as ours, and thus, that questions of absolute or 
intrinsic meaning are illegitimate. First, we learn that ‘notions… of a motive, of an 
interest, and of a maxim, can be applied only to finite beings’ (p.84/205). Then later, Kant 
invites us to imagine (though it is impossible) that we could experience things not just 
from our limited perspective, but rather, in their totality, such that ‘God and eternity with 
their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes’ (p.157/294). From that 
perspective, Kant adds, the many conflicts between our finite consciousness and the 
demands of reason would be avoided such that we would achieve a kind of mechanistic 
infallibility. Yet he also adds that in such a situation: 
 
…the moral worth of actions, on which alone in the eyes of supreme wisdom the 
worth of the person and even that of the world depends would cease to exist. As 
long as the nature of man remains what it is, his conduct would be thus be 
changed into mere mechanism, in which, as in a puppet-show, everything would 
gesticulate well, but there would be no life in the figures. 
(C.Pract.R. p.157/294, my emphasis)  
 
The implication is clear – it is only by virtue of the kind of finite consciousness that we 
possess, and only within the sphere of possible experience for such a finite consciousness 
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that the sort of meaning and, now we can also add, worth necessary for morality can 
arise. Thus, to ask of the instrinsic morality of things aside from our experience is not to 
ask a legitimate question – intrinsically, things lack meaning and worth. In short, within 
C.Pract.R. we can find the thought, mentioned above in relation to the First Antinomy, 
that since it is, by definition, extrinsic to human experience, we can only expect a blind 
‘is’ from the standpoint of the thing itself.  
 
I take this to be sufficient to show that within C.Pract.R. Kant runs both the ‘reason’ and 
‘thing in itself’ models concurrently in his account of the possibility of morality. 
Sometimes, as at p.5/109, the operative distinction is clearly between the thing itself and 
appearances, whereas at other times, such as at p.112/238-9, the operative distinction 
required to make space for the necessary intelligible entities is clearly that between 
reason and sensibility. Further, since Kant also runs the thought of the intrinsically blind 
‘is’ of things aside of our finite consciousness of them, the ‘thing in itself’ model remains 
problematic for the reasons discussed above, namely that morality’s ‘ought’ surely 
requires the notions of meaning and worth, which as is here made explicit, are peculiar to 
the human standpoint. And of course this brings us back yet again to the question we 
have pressed throughout this opening chapter, namely, if Kant’s texts can be shown to 
accommodate (if not appreciate) the sufficiency of the ‘reason’ model to keep open the 
possibility of morality, and (as Kant seems not to appreciate at all), the ‘reason’ model in 
fact seems superior to the ‘thing in itself’ model in this regard, then why should we think 
that the thing in itself is of any use to us in moral matters? 
 
§1:iv.iii) Critique of Judgement 
 
A central theme of Critique of Judgement (hereafter, C.ofJ.) is that the only way we can 
make sense of the mutual inter-dependence of part and whole that we find in experience 
is through our introduction, indeed imposition of the distinctly human notion of purpose 
or ‘determination of ends’ upon intuition, such that the idea of the whole precedes and 
determines the production and arrangement of the parts. The comparison of a house with 
a product of nature at §65 (p.200-1/372-3) is a prime example. 
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Thus a house is certainly the cause of the money that is received in rent, but yet, 
conversely, the representation of this possible income was the cause of the 
building of the house…But if a thing is a product of nature and in this character is 
notwithstanding to contain intrinsically and in its inner possibility a relation to 
ends, in other words, is to be possible only…independently of the causality of 
rational agents, then this second requisite is involved, namely that… the idea of 
the whole may, conversely, or reciprocally, determine in its turn the form and 
combination of all the parts, not as cause – for that would make it an [human] art 
product – but as the ground for the cognition of the systematic unity of the form 
and cognition of the systemic unity of the form and combination of all the 
manifold contained in the given matter for the person judging it. 
(C.ofJ. p.200-1/372, my emphasis) 
 
As I understand it, the idea here is that natural purposes, such as we ordinarily experience 
(or perhaps better, presuppose) them, are not intelligible merely in terms of the laws of 
nature, and so the unity of experience presupposes that we impose upon intuition the 
notion of purpose, or purposiveness, analogous to that employed in the creation of, say, a 
house or an artwork. We see here the now familiar dichotomy in Kant’s thought of, on 
the one hand, a conception of a blank-slate ‘is’ of things aside from our experience of 
them, and on the other, peculiarly human ideas, of which ‘purpose’, or ‘purposiveness’ 
are examples, which we impose upon intuition, such that experience is unified and 
meaningful in the manner in which we find it. Indeed, this dichotomy finds its most 
explicit formulation within C.ofJ., such that nature is regarded as ‘mere mechanism’, and 
it is ‘only outside the conception of nature, and not in it, that we may hope to find some 
shadow of a ground…for that unity’ (p.188/360).  
 
Whilst the counterpoising of blind deterministic mechanism and meaningful purpose is 
largely familiar from the foregoing exegesis and discussion, there is a further thought in 
C.ofJ. that so securely cements the notion of the blind ‘is’ of things aside from human 
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experience of them that it stands to distance Kant’s two uses of the thing in itself even 
further, rendering them irreconcilable. 
 
…if our understanding were intuitive it would have no objects but such as are 
actual. Concepts, which are merely directed to the possibility of an object, and 
sensuous intuitions, which give us something and yet do not thereby let us 
cognize it as an object, would both cease to exist. Now the whole distinction 
which we draw between the possible and the merely actual rests upon the fact that 
possibility signifies the position of the representation of a thing relatively to our 
concept, and, in general, to our capacity of thinking, whereas the actuality 
signifies the positing of the thing in its intrinsic existence apart from this concept. 
Accordingly the distinction of possible from actual things is one that is merely 
valid subjectively for human understanding. It arises from the fact that even if 
something does not exist, we may yet always give it a place in our thoughts, or if 
there is something of which we have no concept we may nevertheless imagine it 
given. To say, therefore, that things may be possible without being actual, that 
from mere possibility, therefore, no actuality may be drawn, is to state 
propositions that hold true for human reason, without such validity providing that 
this distinction lies in the things themselves. 
(C.ofJ. p.229-30/402 my emphasis). 
 
As I understand it, the thought here
9
 is that possibility signifies nothing about the content 
of a judgement per se, but denotes one of those curious contingencies that give rise to the 
sort of experience in which we find ourselves immersed. Possibility, as elucidated in the 
above quotation, is distinguished from actuality only as a consequence of the distinct 
cognitive capacities of the understanding and sensibility and their inter-relation in 
                                                 
9
 It seems here pertinent to quote Schelling’s remark that ‘[n]ever, perhaps, have so many deep thoughts 
been pressed together in so few pages as is the case in section 76 of the Critique of the Teleological Power 
of Judgement’ (AA I,2:175; SWI:242, in Förster, E. (2012), p.141). There is a lot going on this short 
passage and, once again drawing heavily on diGiovanni (2005) (esp. p.21-24), I limit my discussion to the 
distinction made between possibility and actuality. 
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judgement – if intuition were not divorced from the understanding, that is, if the 
understanding were itself intuitive, possibility would fall since any distinction between 
abstract discursivity and the particular realization of objects in experience would simply 
disappear: we would see God and nature in all their awful majesty, but the possibility of 
conceiving otherwise would be lost. To distinguish between the possible and the actual 
presupposes the ability to distinguish what is given discursively from what is given from 
sensibility, which itself presupposes a cognitive faculty of understanding distinct from a 
faculty of intuition. Thus, possibility is unique to the human standpoint.  
 
Yet if this is the case, and, as Kant puts it, ‘the distinction of possible from actual things 
is one that is merely valid subjectively for human understanding’, surely, from the 
objective viewpoint of the thing in itself, possibility finds no valid application at all. What 
we learn from §76 is that possibility arises only by virtue of the particular interaction of 
our limited cognitive faculties. Within this context, the thing in itself stands simply as a 
theoretical construct – a conceivable object that simply is and in regard to which 
possibility is entirely alien - the conceptual counterpart to anything we could ever 
experience, given the divorced, yet inter-related nature of the understanding and intuition 
in human consciousness. ‘[A]ctuality signifies the positing of the thing in its intrinsic 
existence apart from this concept.’ For Kant then, note the irony underwriting the human 
ability of conceiving otherwise: that by virtue of which we can conceive of the possible is 
also that by virtue of which we can conceive the possibility of the non-possible. Only by 
virtue of the interplay of the discursive and the receptive is it even conceivable to think of 
that which is given in sensibility aside from its interaction with the understanding – only 
by virtue of the concept of ‘possibility’ yielded by the understanding can one even 
conceive of what it would be like to lack an understanding, and thereby think the 
possibility of non-possibility.  
 
In many ways, the thought expressed here simply fleshes out the implications of the 
‘Copernican’ turn, as expressed at Bxvi, to investigate not whether cognition conforms to 
objects, but rather whether objects conform to cognition. The upshot of the critical 
investigation, as expressed at the end of the above passage (C.ofJ. p.230/402), is that the 
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nature of our cognitive faculties commits us to a particular kind of experience of the 
world, but that this peculiarly human experience to which we are committed gives us no 
assurance that there is anything in the objects themselves that corresponds to our 
experience. We have already seen that meaning (CPR), worth (C.Pract.R.) and purpose 
(C.ofJ.) all fall squarely within, even constitute, the uniquely human standpoint, beyond 
which they find no legitimate application. Now we learn that possibility too can be added 
to that list.  
 
Now, I take it as a given that possibility is essential to any conception of morality. The 
entirety of our moral language, ‘responsibility’, ‘obligation’, ‘guilt’, ‘merit’, indeed, even 
the ‘ought’, all collapse unless we are committed to the possibility of things and events 
being other than they in fact are (or were). If possibility falls, it takes with it the whole 
artifice of judging actions against a norm that transcends their actuality. If that goes, it 
becomes inconceivable to coherently discuss (even if we fail to determine) how things 
ought to be. Without possibility, the ought not only fails to trump the is, it becomes a 
non-thought. As diGiovanni puts the point, ‘[i]f the distinction between actuality and 
possibility is strictly a function of human cognition, yet this distinction is essential to 
moral language, it follows that, when tested against the ideal thing in itself, moral 
language loses all meaning’ (diGiovanni (2005), p.21)10. 
 
diGiovanni comments that Kant must be employing ‘possibility’ in two different ways, 
albeit unwittingly ((2005) p.21). On the one hand, Kant’s theoretical inquiries into the 
workings of our finite, limited consciousness leads him, as in §76, to view ‘possibility’ as 
a cognitive peculiarity of human beings. That is, at times Kant is committed to the strictly 
relative nature of ‘possibility’ – ‘possibility’ as unique to the human condition11. Despite 
                                                 
10
 Again, whilst diGiovanni takes a particular stance on what ‘ideal’ implies here, I leave that question 
unaddressed. 
11
 It is on this basis that diGiovanni reads transcendental idealism as decidedly ‘metaphysical’ in the 
tradition of Descartes, Spinoza and Liebniz. Thus, “[t]his was however, as far-reaching a metaphysical 
commitment as any Enlightenment philosopher would have dared to advance’ ((2005) p.20) and also, “[s]o 
construed, [intellectual intuition in §76] is reminiscent of the theological notion of God’s creative act; or, 
closer to home, of Descartes’s and Spinoza’s causa sui” ((2005) p.22). Again, wishing to leave the question 
of the ultimate metaphysical status of transcendental idealism to one side, I have attempted to reconstruct a 
metaphysically neutral variation on diGiovanni’s theme, using his insight only as a point from which to 
critique the thing in itself (whatever its metaphysical baggage may be) as locus for intelligible entities.  
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this, indeed against this commitment, when it comes to Kant’s moral theory, ‘possibility’ 
must surely hold beyond the exclusivity of the human standpoint, that is, unconditionally. 
The point is important not least because Kant famously tells us of the unconditional hold 
of the moral ought, but also because he introduces the kingdom of ends not as a 
community of finitely rational human being, but rather as a community of purely rational 
beings (Gr, 4:433).  
 
With diGiovanni’s further insight into the implications of Kant’s uses of ‘possibility’ in 
mind, we see just how ill-suited the thing in itself is to accommodate the intelligible 
entities necessary for morality. Conceived of in the manner of §76, the thing in itself 
stands to entirely negate any real possibility of morality, rather than accommodating it. 
Indeed, if the thing in itself is here conceived of as the theoretical antithesis to possibility, 
each of the above two senses of possibility are negated from the viewpoint of the thing in 
itself. That is, if, for morality, possibility is to hold unconditionally (as in the kingdom of 
ends), and possibility and the thing in itself cannot be coherently conceived as coexisting 
in the same theoretical space, then the unconditional hold of possibility and the thing in 
itself simply fail to meet. Alternatively, if possibility holds only for human beings (and 
presumably then not in the kingdom of ends) it still finds no place from the viewpoint of 
the thing in itself. Thus, neither of the two conceptions of possibility, which Kant runs 
together, are accommodated by the postulation of the thing in itself. And note further, 
that yet again, the operative distinction here is between spatiotemporal appearances on 
the one hand - here viewed as that which is initially given through sensibility - and on the 
other, reason’s faculty of the understanding. Granted, the intelligible entities necessary 
for morality and with them the uniquely human experiences of meaning, worth, purpose 
and possibility are nowhere to be found from the viewpoint of the spatiotemporal. Yet, 
they are nowhere to be found from this viewpoint of the thing in itself either. Thus, with 
the pivotal distinction necessary for the possibility of morality being reason and 
sensibility, and the thing in itself as a blind ‘is’, an empty void equally as incapable as 
spatiotemporal appearances of accommodating the notions of meaning, worth, purpose 
and possibility necessary for morality, we are once again left asking: why should we 
 32 
think that the distinction between the thing in itself and appearances will help us in moral 
matters?  
 
§1:v) Kantian replies. 
 
I have suggested that Kant runs two different conceptions of the thing in itself together 
within the critical project, and further, that because they are modally distinct they fail to 
meet up. Kant seems committed to envisioning the thing in itself as a blind is that stands 
as a counterpoint to our meaningful, moral lives and yet also employs the thing in itself 
as that which ostensibly makes such a life conceivable without contradiction. And of 
course, the problem is that the blind is just does stand to contradict the meaningful moral 
lives we live. Now, suppose we admit that the ‘blind is conception’ of the thing in itself is 
the result of Kant’s theoretical inquiries, indeed, marks the pinnacle of the investigation 
into theoretical reason. Suppose further, that the space for intelligible entities made by 
the thing in itself is the result of Kant’s moral inquiries, indeed, that this marks the 
pinnacle of the investigation into practical reason. Might a distinction between 
theoretical reason (and its impasse) and practical reason dissolve the concern about the 
divergent uses of the thing in itself? The materials for such a response might be thought 
to reside in Allison’s work. 
 
Allison admits that theoretical (‘speculative’) reason fails to accommodate ‘the reality of 
an unconditioned causality’ necessary for the intelligible entities. He goes on to suggest 
that at best, theoretical reason can ‘merely defend it against the charge of 
inconceivability…by creating a “vacant place” for it in an intelligible world’ (Allison 
(1990) p.243). Allison’s further thought is that ‘pure practical reason fills this vacancy 
through the moral law, thereby resolving speculative reason’s problem... [Thus] the moral 
law gives a positive sense to the indeterminate notion of an intelligible causality.’ ((1990) 
p.244). The idea is that theoretical reason finds the end of its tether with the blind is, 
which, as we have seen, fails to accommodate intelligible entities, thereby bringing the 
possibility of morality into question. Nonetheless, we find ‘the ought’ in our moral 
experience. Theoretical reason thus simultaneously requires and fails to accommodate 
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that which is necessary for morality, and its inquiries into the thing in itself reflect as 
much. This is ok though, since practical reason makes good on theoretical reason’s 
deficiency, by stepping into the ‘vacant space’ in demonstrating the initiation of 
intelligible causality in moral action (though the ultimate grounds of this intelligible 
causality remain unknowable, given theoretical reason’s impasse). For Allison then, far 
from pulling in opposite directions, theoretical and practical reason are unified just in 
making right each others deficiencies. Practical reason demonstrates precisely that which 
theoretical reason needs but cannot find, and theoretical reason explains why its source is 
in principle unknowable.  
 
The problem with Allison’s line of thought is that it still fails to reconcile the two uses of 
the thing in itself at play. The heart of the problem is that theoretical reason does not find 
its end in a ‘vacant space’ in the sense of an empty room awaiting the delivery of some 
metaphysical or intentional furniture. Rather, theoretical reason is left concluding that the 
thing in itself must be a ‘vacant space’ in the sense of a vacuum, and a vacuum simply 
cannot accommodate any furniture – it is, by definition, simply a void. Allison appears to 
miss the importance of this modal distinction in commenting that theoretical reason 
defends intelligible entities ‘against the charge of inconceivability’. In fact, theoretical 
reason leads us to the opposite conclusion from Kant’s – Kant ought to conclude that 
unconditioned causality is not just inconceivable beyond the human standpoint, but is 
modally distinct from, and thus not attributable to the blind, empty thing in itself. It is not 
the case that theoretical reason makes a space for intelligible causality – rather, Kant 
ought to view intelligent causality as altogether distinct from theoretical reason’s scope. 
As Strawson puts it: “[i]t has nothing to do with the interests of theoretical reason” 
(Strawson (1966) p.213).  
 
More, it is for precisely this reason that Allison’s insistence on reminding us that the idea 
of freedom plays a merely regulative role in Kant’s philosophy (Allison (1990) p.45-6) 
also fails to get off the ground. Regulative or not, if the space made vacant by the 
theoretical philosophy is such that the demonstration of freedom in the practical 
philosophy cannot fit in it, then the two entirely fail to speak to each other. Worse, even if 
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Allison were correct to understand practical and theoretical reason as unified in moral 
acts, the puzzle over the thing in itself would still remain. Suppose we grant Kant (and 
Allison) that theoretical reason meets its exhaustion in the blind is, and further, that 
practical reason demonstrates precisely that causality that lies beyond this limit. Are we 
not still left asking why this intelligible causality finds accommodation in the thing in 
itself? Indeed, on Allison’s account it is clearly (practical) reason that does the work, so 
why are we to go the extra step with Kant in postulating the thing in itself here? And if 
we do go that extra mile, surely we are still left head-scratching over how the thing in 
itself qua vacuum could possibly retain its (properly conceived) ‘vacant’ status whilst 
also accommodating intelligent entities – how could it be necessarily empty, yet 
pregnant?  
 
Further, I suggest that once this point is properly appreciated, the force of the 
contemporary Kantian defensive arsenal is largely, if not entirely disarmed. Critical 
ignorance fails to dissolve this issue, as does timeless agency. 
  
Kantians often like to maintain that criticisms of Kant’s use of the thing in itself mistake 
its necessarily unknowable character for irresolvable difficulties or contradictions about 
Kant’s position itself. Since, by definition, no knowledge can be attained of the thing in 
itself, it should come as no surprise that talk of it strikes us as not-a-little unfathomable 
and mysterious. What the Kantian philosophy offers is not a full explanation that removes 
this mystery or unfathomable-ness, but rather, the proper philosophical framework within 
which to articulate our ignorance. Thus, ‘[t]ranscendental idealism translates the 
mysteriousness of human freedom into something at least negatively comprehensible, 
giving our ignorance of its nature rational form’ (Gardner (1999) p.264). So of course 
questions remain unanswered by the Critical philosophy, but that is because such 
questions are in principle unanswerable. Perhaps then the question of how the thing in 
itself can accommodate intelligible entities is a question of this kind. Freedom, Kantians 
might say, ought to remain weird for a consciousness like ours.  
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The obvious concern with the appeal to Critical ignorance is that insisting on the 
weirdness of the account might just mask some bad philosophy. As Freyenhagen puts it: 
“[t]he appeal to the black box of the intelligible realm does not give us sufficient 
assurance that what looks like a contradiction is no such thing.” ((2008) p.68). Indeed, the 
point at issue here is not that we want to know something beyond ‘the bounds of sense’. 
If it were, critical ignorance might be a good response. Instead the point is that the appeal 
to the bounds of sense so central to the theoretical project seems to preclude the 
possibility of the thing in itself being the locus of the intelligible entities necessary for the 
moral project. The appeal to Critical ignorance just does not bridge the distinct modalities 
of blind-ness and empty-ness on the one hand, and on the other the accommodation of the 
whole package of fully determinate meaning that Kant needs for the intelligible entities. 
What we have here just is a philosophically unpalatable equivocation from thing in itself 
qua vacuum when we need it in the theoretical project, to thing in itself qua empty room 
capable of accommodating philosophical decoration in the practical philosophy – and 
these two conceptions simply fail to hang together. So even if we grant the ultimate 
unknowability of the thing in itself, we are still left with a puzzle over what exactly it is 
that we are ignorant of – is it the blind void, or its modally distinct counterpoint, the locus 
of intelligible entities? Far from dissolving this issue then, critical ignorance is central to 
the problem.  
 
More, any appeal to timeless agency here seems misguided. As we have seen, for Kant, 
the spatiotemporal arena cannot accommodate intelligible entities. Thus moral agency 
must be for Kant, in some sense timeless (A539/B567; A551-3/B579-81). Note though 
that whether or not Wood is correct to view the notion of a non-temporal agency as 
coherent given Kant’s understanding of causality (Wood (1983) p.86-9), or whether 
Allison is correct to think of agency as timeless in the sense that conclusions following 
from premises is timeless or even in the sense that the maxims underlying moral action 
are based on non-temporal principles (Allison (1990) p.47-53) – all of this is secondary to 
the question of where this non-temporal agency is supposed to be happening. That is, 
Kant locates this agency as operating at the level or viewpoint of the thing in itself, and 
the problem is that agency, timeless or not, requires a sphere of meaning, indeed some 
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accommodation of meaningful deliberation. Yet if agency requires meaning, and meaning 
is modally distinct from the thing in itself qua vacuum, then this understanding of the 
thing in itself is ill suited for Kant’s moral project. We might say that for Kant, if the 
agency is timeless, then it must also be meaningless, since what there simply is no 
bridging the modal distinction he makes between the blind is on the one hand, and space, 
time and meaning on the other. Thus, the notion of timeless agency also fails to resolve 
the issue.  
 
Indeed, as Freyenhagen (2008) has shown, with the case of timeless agency, we see a 
further, analogous complication with the thing in itself. From the aesthetic, we know that 
space and time are nothing but the pure forms of intuition, are thus ideal and that by 
‘ideal’ it is understood that they do not pertain to the thing in itself (A32-6/B49-53). 
Now, if agency is to be remotely recognizable as agency it must surely involve the 
capacity to act, and the very notion of action is surely inseperable from the notion of 
time. There must be a ‘moment’ when principles are assented to, as even Allison admits. 
Yet, with ‘moment’, we are back speaking the language of time once more. As 
Freyenhagen puts it, ‘on Allison’s own reading…what grounds reason a free decision is 
an act of reason (the incorporation of an incentive into a maxim) and…this act has to be 
temporal’ ((2008) p.83). So if timeless agency is accommodated only by the thing in 
itself, and is coherent only if time is postulated, then a new, seperate conception of time 
is needed, if not a further temporal arena, aside from the deterministic spatiotemporal one 
that Kant has already dismissed. Further, since Kant has already made clear that time 
finds no application with regard to the thing in itself, if we are to accept that timeless 
agency is accommodated by the thing in itself yet still requires (new) time, it seems the 
account must end up looking worryingly un-Kantian. 
 
Last, it will likely not have gone unnoticed that the discussion thus far has made no use of 
a possible distinction between the thing in itself and noumena. Indeed, the abundance of 
passages, spanning the entire critical enterprise, in which the attribution of intelligible 
entities to man is justified on the basis of the conceivability of man as noumenon (see 
CPR (A541/B569); C.Pract.R. (p.123/252); C.ofJ. (p.264/435) and MM (p.215/418)) 
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would seem to add considerable credence to this thought. Further, Allison’s 
comprehensive discussion of Kant’s moral thought (1990) scarcely makes mention of the 
thing in itself at all, instead almost exclusively contrasting phenomena with noumena. 
Could such a distinction serve to alleviate the tension between the opposing uses of the 
thing in itself, such that the thing in itself is conceived of as the blind is, leaving space for 
the noumena/phenomena distinction to accommodate the intelligible entities necessary 
for morality? I suggest not, since noumena and the thing in itself are suitably close to 
each other in important respects that the criticisms leveled at the thing in itself hold true 
for noumena, even if the two can be distinguished from each other - but this will take 
some unpacking. 
 
Firstly, Kant himself often simply assumes that there is no distinction to be made 
between the thing in itself and noumena. At one point he comments that we are free to 
equate to two (A288/B344-5), at other points he uses them interchangeably (A249), 
indeed, sometimes within the same sentence (A253, A254/B310, A259/B315). The two 
are undeniably part of a package since there is a considerable overlap between them. Yet 
subtle distinctions make it possible to distinguish them. The thought here is that the thing 
in itself can be taken to refer specifically to the idea of an object aside from it as given in 
experience. Recall the discussion of §76 of C.ofJ., where actuality was said to signify ‘the 
positing of the thing in its intrinsic existence’ and thus void of the discursive elements 
that reason’s faculty of understanding brings to it. In this sense, the thing in itself, qua 
idea of an object aside from how we represent it, stands only as a direct logical correlate 
to the cognition of objects in experience. Taken in this sense, the idea thing in itself arises 
out of philosophical reflection on perception and the status of the objects given therein. 
Noumena could then be distinguished from this narrow conception of the thing in itself if 
we were to understand by it the more general conception of a mere postulate of the pure 
understanding or reason (A249), the very idea of which arises not directly from 
meditation on sense perception and its objects, but rather as a kind of ‘unavoidable, 
conceptual shadow of our immanent experience’ (Bird, (2006) p.706). Thus conceived, 
noumena could stand to denote, in extremely broad terms, an inevitable conceptual 
residue left over from experience, whereas the thing in itself is conceived of within far- 
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more narrow parameters simply as a specific example of such, namely the thought of an 
object aside from our experience of it. 
 
[t]he concept of a noumenon…does not signify a determinate cognition of any 
sort of thing, but rather only the thinking of something in general, in which I 
abstract from all form of sensible intuition. 
(A252) 
 
With this in mind, we can address the question of whether a distinction between noumena 
and phenomena could put right the concerns expressed over the inadequacy of the 
distinction between the thing in itself and phenomena. Indeed, the question at hand could 
be posed something like, granted that the thing in itself was found to be too narrow to 
accommodate the intelligible entities necessary for the possibility of morality, could 
intelligible entities themselves not be examples of noumena?  
 
There are indeed important similarities between the intelligible entities and noumena that 
might speak in favour of such a reading, namely, both intelligible entities and noumena 
are conceived of as ‘given to the understanding alone and not to the senses at all’ 
(A257/B313). That is, the break with sensibility that noumena ushers in, and with which 
the thing in itself is so inextricably tied up (at least on the narrow reading of the thing in 
itself presently discussed) seems to place noumena and the necessary intelligible entities 
appropriately close. Building on this thought, we might also note that whilst the idea of 
the thing in itself (in this narrow sense) is an idea of an object extrinsic to our conscious 
experience, the idea of noumena is an idea of something intrinsic to our experience; the 
distinction is between, on the one hand, an extrapolation upon sensibility and the 
understanding (thing in itself) and on the other, an extrapolation of pure reason’s faculty 
of the understanding alone (noumena). In this sense then, the sort of inquiry that leads 
one to the conception of noumena looks a lot more like something akin to mathematical 
 39 
exposition, and not anything like reflection upon sense perception
12
. Thus the equation of 
intelligible entities with noumena rather than the thing in itself seems to fit more neatly 
with some of Kant’s statements regarding the need to explain freedom and morality 
‘without going out of ourselves’ (C.Pract.R., p p.112/238-9)13. This is presumably how 
Kant sees the matter, at least at the moments when noumena and the intelligible are 
conflated.  
 
Yet it is for familiar reasons that noumena simply fail to alleviate the particular tension 
highlighted in the preceding. Once again, critical ignorance is delivers the final blow, 
rather than offering deliverance. The concept of a noumenon, Kant tells us explicitly, is 
‘merely a boundary concept, in order to limit the pretension of sensibility, and [is] 
therefore only of negative use’ (A255/B311). Yet if this is the case, then noumena falls 
prey to all the same pitfalls that faced the thing in itself. That is, thus conceived, noumena 
stands as a conceptual counterpart to spatiotemporal phenomena, since it has only 
negative use, and nothing positive can be said of it, such that it too is ‘empty (for us)’ 
(A255/B311). Yet if this is the case, then surely it also stands as a conceptual counterpart 
to our experiences of meaning, worth, purpose and possibility without which morality 
simply crumbles away. Precisely because it only acts only as a boundary concept, itself 
empty, and thus stands to counterpoise everything necessary for an experience of 
morality, the introduction of a distinction between noumena and phenomena fails to put 
right the relevant deficiencies of the distinction between the thing in itself and 
phenomena. I labour this point further if only because of its importance for what will 
follow. Neither the thing in itself nor noumena are such that we could possibly have 
knowledge of them. Thus, nothing positive pertains to our notion of either, and they each 
find merely negative use. The upshot is that our experiences of meaning, worth and 
possibility only find legitimate application within human experience – that is, they are all 
relative and peculiar to the human condition, and cannot be ascribed to the intrinsic 
nature of things (ie not to the thing in itself) and further, have no general intrinsic 
                                                 
12
 so far as the two can be distanced within the critical philosophy. 
13
 This theme and its bearing on the objectivity of the moral law will be examined in more detail in the next 
section. 
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application per se (ie find no place among noumena). Yet, Kant’s wider moral project, 
with its invocation of a community of rational beings and the pursuit of a kingdom of 
ends requires that meaning, worth and possibility find precisely the kind of supra-human, 
if not unconditional application (ie, that beyond the merely contingent and limited human 
consciousness) that the restriction of noumena to a boundary concept with only negative 
use seems to rule out. 
 
As a further thought, itself an extension of the last, we might also comment that if 
noumena are to be considered as the conceptual shadows, or discursive residue left over, 
indeed, resultant of, immanent experience, then noumena would have to follow 
experience. Yet Kant is clear – the moral law commands immediately. If intelligible 
entities were noumena, would they not come on the scene too late for them to be 
accommodated by the immediate nature of morality?  
 
With these points in mind, we are left asking not only why a distinction between the thing 
in itself and phenomena might make possible the space for morality, but further, why we 
would think that the distinction between noumena and phenomena would be any more 
enlightening in this regard. 
 41 
§2:Kantian Constructivism 
In the first chapter we saw that within Kant’s practical philosophy two distinct lines of 
argument can be discerned, one where the contrast between reason and spatiotemporal 
appearances makes the necessary space for intelligible entities, and another which 
introduces the thing in itself. Further it was noted that the thing in itself is ill-suited for 
Kant’s practical philosophy since it fails to accommodate the intelligible entities. Given 
then that the thing in itself seems so antithetical to what Kant actually needs to get his 
moral project going it seems pertinent to ask whether if we ditch the thing itself we must 
also ditch the moral philosophy that Kant constructs on its back. That is, could we still do 
‘Kantian’ ethics if we left behind Kant’s own problematic appeal to the thing in itself?  
 
On the face of it, the prospects seem encouraging. After all, we noted that the thing in 
itself is superfluous since Kant has the resources to resolve the Third Antinomy using the 
‘reason model’. Indeed, because Kant conflates the ‘reason model’ with the ‘thing in 
itself model’ so gratuitously, there is no shortage of textual accommodation for the 
centrality of reason right the way through Kant’s ethics, from the most fundamental of 
topics, the Third Antinomy, through to the more familiarly ‘ethical’ topics, such as lying, 
suicide and the rest that are found in the explicitly moral works. Indeed, at times Kant 
himself is quite clear that whatever the account of the absolute character of the moral law 
may be, such an account must remain immanent, not transcendent (C.Pract.R. p.50/164, 
p.112/238). Might Kant’s own use of reason in his practical philosophy then be a more 
promising candidate than the thing in itself for the basis of a broadly-conceived ‘Kantian’ 
ethics?  
 
In this chapter I will look at three influential attempts to pursue just such a path by the 
ethical constructivists, John Rawls, Onora O’Neill and Christine Korsgaard. Ultimately I 
will suggest that these constructivist interpretations of Kant’s ethics, though right to 
reject the thing in itself, neglect certain insights that Kant was keen to incorporate into his 
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own project about the way morality appears to us, and more broadly, that they 
consequently misunderstand Kant’s conception of the task of moral philosophy.  
 
§2:i) Constructivism and Metaphysics  
‘Constructivism’, conceived broadly, will be taken to denote a paradigm for morals in 
which normative practical principles are ushered in by certain ‘constructive procedures’ 
of agents themselves. Though they are not always conceived of as incompatible with 
other paradigms of ethics where moral principles are taken by agents to be grounded in 
facts about the way things are aside from our experience them, constructivist models 
always stand in conscious distinction from them (see eg, Ralws (1975) p.286-8; (1993) 
p.116-8). That is, constructivist models tend to try and side-step many of the ‘big’ 
traditional metaphysical issues that have dogged moral philosophy, such as eg, offering 
comprehensive, (in Kant’s terms ‘transcendent’) explanations or defences of moral values 
or the good life, and also, we should add, the ultimate metaphysical truth regarding 
human freedom.  
 
…we do not require of a moral…judgment that the reasons for it show it to be 
related to an appropriate causal process... Rather, it is enough that the reasons 
offered be suitably strong. We explain our judgment, so far as we do, simply by 
going over the grounds for it: the explanation lies in the reasons we sincerely 
affirm. What more is there to say except to question our sincerity and 
reasonableness?  
(Rawls (1993) p.118) 
 
Note then that the kinds of concerns with which Kant wrestles in the Third Antinomy is 
quite foreign to the kinds of concerns of the constructivists. Historically problematic 
metaphysical questions are treated as off-limits for the constructivists, and the focus 
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instead is with the matter immediately at hand – namely, morality here and now. This is 
the sense in which for Rawls, moral theory is ‘independent’ from the rest of philosophy 
((1975) p.286-302). Yet note also the similarity between the constructivists and Kant 
here. Though in the Third Antinomy and elsewhere, Kant wrestles with the historically 
problematic question of the metaphysics of human freedom, his ultimate position is one 
of ignorance. As we saw, Kant does not think that theoretical reason could ever offer a 
definitive answer to that question. Further, as the constructivists build their moral theory 
on the back of insulating it from metaphysics, it is on the back of this ignorance regarding 
freedom that Kant builds his ethics. In this sense then, though the parameters of their 
conversations are distinct, we might find enough similarity between them and Kant to 
think of the constructivists as broadly-Kantian. 
  
§2:ii.i) Rawls 
Since constructivism, thus conceived, more or less starts with John Rawls, and Rawls 
offers a constructivist reading of Kant’s moral philosophy, it seems only fitting to start 
with his account. Recall that Kant supposes that it is the appeal to the thing in itself that 
ensures the possibility of morality. Clearly for Rawls, by insulating moral theory from 
metaphysics (1975; 1993), such an appeal is ruled out. Further, as we have seen in 
chapter one, this seems fortuitous, since the thing in itself brings with it more trouble than 
good. More, Rawls agrees that the blind is of things apart from human reason cannot be 
the locus of morality. In his ‘Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy’ ((1989) hereafter 
‘Themes’) Rawls comments that ‘there exists no moral order prior to and independent of 
the form of the procedure that specifies the content of first principles of right and justice 
among free and equal persons’ ((1989) p.97). Without the thing in itself, nor any other 
prior or ‘external’ set of moral principles are available to him, Rawls needs to find 
another candidate to open up the possibility of morality and he thinks he finds it in Kant’s 
conception of practical reason.  
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Rawls’ basic idea is that we start from a normatively loaded, though uncontroversial, 
conception of persons as ‘free and equal’, and construct a set of principles that follow 
from this non-controversial account of agency. As such, moral commands gain their 
authority not from any fact to be discerned about the world aside from our experience of 
it, nor from any particularly complex moral psychology or hierarchy of values, but rather 
from a constructive procedure based on uncontroversial claims about persons. It is the 
procedure that specifies the first principles of right and justice (which we may here just 
call moral principles) and further, it is through that procedure that the content of the 
moral law is constructed. Note then that prior to the procedure there are simply no moral 
facts to be known. Rather, moral facts depend on the constructive actions of agents who 
go through a particular procedure.  
 
Apart from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no 
moral facts. Whether certain facts are to be recognized as reasons of right or 
justice, or how much they are to count, can be ascertained only from within the 
constructive procedure, that is, from the undertakings of rational agents of 
construction when suitably represented as free and equal moral persons. 
(‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’ (1980), hereafter ‘Kantian 
Constructivism’, p.519) 
 
Further, since the procedure is grounded firmly in practical reason, consensus in morality 
is accommodated. 
 
…we must suppose, as Kant does, that whoever applies the CI-procedure, roughly 
the same judgements are reached, provided the procedure is applied intelligently 
and conscientiously, and against the background of roughly the same beliefs and 
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information. Reasonable and rational persons must recognize more or less the 
same reasons and give them more or less the same weight. 
(‘Themes’, p.101, my emphasis). 
 
To summarize Rawls’ ‘Kantian’ position, there are moral facts in the world, but only 
ones that arise via the constructed principles that follow from a mutual understanding of 
each other as free and equal persons. Further, objectivity of the judgements made 
according to such principles is ensured by the ‘background of roughly the same beliefs 
and information’ shared by agents. So whilst Rawls’ theory is constructivist in the sense 
that the foundational moral principles arise out of something people do rather than some 
fact about the world aside from experience, the procedure itself is not chosen, but is a 
consequence of the uniform character of the faculty of reason common to all, and the 
given social surroundings. 
 
What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to 
and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves 
and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions 
embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. 
(‘Kantian Constructivism’, p.519) 
 
§2:ii.ii) O’Neill 
Whilst O’Neill is broadly sympathetic Rawls’ project, she is surely right to point out the 
decidedly relativistic spin that Rawls, apparently inadvertently, adds to Kant’s thought in 
his account of the objectivity of the moral law. The problem, as O’Neill presciently notes, 
ultimately lies with Rawls’ starting point – that of an idealized conception of free and 
equal persons. Whilst Kant surely shares such an ideal conception with Rawls (though 
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retaining ultimate ignorance of the noumenal fact of the matter regarding freedom), it is 
not the starting point of Kant’s moral philosophy. Rather, to the extent that Kant starts his 
moral philosophy with a conception of persons at all, he begins with the far more abstract 
conception of ‘homo noumenon’, at other times with a ‘subject whose actions can be 
imputed to him’ (MM, p.50/223) or even more generally, with the concept of the 
unconditionally good will, taken in its broadest sense (Gr, 4:393), but not with socially 
embedded persons. Further, as O’Neill is at pains to point out, when Rawls lays out his 
reading of Kantian moral theory, it is not just any old notion of socially embedded 
persons that he begins with, nor simply with a general fact that people are socially 
embedded, but rather, with the specific conception of free and equal persons. It was 
commented above that such a conception was normatively loaded, though non-
controversial. O’Neill’s reply to Rawls here is that this starting point is controversial 
because it assumes that just these normative assumptions are generic or universal. As 
O’Neill sees the matter though, this is far from the case, with the result that Rawls seems 
markedly un-Kantian in his ensuing relativism.  
 
Rawls [only offers a defence] of those deep principles of justice “we” would 
discover in drawing on “our” underlying conceptions of free and equal 
citizenship. This vindication of justice does not address others, who, unlike “us” 
do not start out with such ideals…[Rawls’] Kantian constructivism, it seems, 
claims only to offer a coherent articulation of the outlook of modern liberal 
societies. The Kantian ideal of the person is socially embedded, and antirelativism 
is not attainable. We are offered a coherent articulation of the deep moral 
commitments of “our” society.  
(Constructions of Reason, (1989) hereafter Constructions, p.211) 
 
O’Neill’s alternative to Rawls’ position is to move away from the socially constructed 
desires of persons, an admittedly heteronomous position for Kant (Gr 4:441-5), and 
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instead root the entire procedural account in rational agency. That is, O’Neill distances 
her account of how the scope of the moral law could be objective from Rawls’ by 
abstracting from agents’ desires, focusing instead on a minimal conception of agents’ 
rationality and then considering what principles it would be possible for those agents to 
act on. O’Neil’s constructivism might thus be seen as an important development on the 
‘reason model’ identified in chapter one as central to Kant’s moral thought, appealing to 
the minimal rationality of the individual to ensure the possibility of morality in a manner 
that avoids the un-Kantian implications of relativism found in Rawls’ thought.  
 
Everything…hinges on constructing principles of justice without presupposing a 
determinate ideal of the person…The core of any such construction is the thought 
that there are certain constraints on the principles of action that could be adopted 
by all of a plurality of potentially interacting agents of whom we assume only 
minimal rationality and indeterminate mutual independence.  
 (Constructions, p.215) 
 
For O’Neill then, the relevant question is not, what desires may people have, nor which 
principles they might ‘choose to live by’, even less their contingent social position or 
surroundings, but rather the modal question ‘what principles can a plurality of agents of 
minimal rationality and indeterminate capacities for mutual independence live by?’ 
(Constructions, p.213). That is, with desire off the menu, O’Neill reconstructs the 
constructivist procedure such that the possible collective agency of a plurality of 
individual, yet interrelated, minimally rational beings plays the operative role in 
generating normative practical principles. The absolute character of morals would then 
follow from the notion that ‘[p]rinciples that cannot be acted on by all must be rejected 
by any plurality’ (Constructions, p.215). Violence and coercion are offered as examples 
of the sort of things that the procedure would reject in the construction of principles, 
since ‘principles of action that hinge on victimizing some, whether by destroying, 
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paralyzing or undercutting their capacities for agency for at least some time and in some 
ways, can be adopted by some but cannot be universally adopted’ (Constructions p.215-
6).  
 
Yet, with desire off the menu, it is incumbent upon O’Neill to offer an account of the 
normative pull of moral principles. How exactly might this minimally rational agency 
generate normative authority? Whilst Rawls could fall back on an idealized notion of 
persons reciprocally respecting each others’ freedom and equality, since O’Neill does not 
accept this as a legitimate starting point, she cannot rely on it and has to find another way 
of accounting for the normative force of practical principles. That is, if practical 
principles are the consequence of constructive procedures, and the principles are to have 
normative force, they must somehow attain that force from the procedures. O’Neill is 
committed to something like the claim that if the procedures are based on reason, and the 
principles that arise out of the procedures have a normative pull or force, then reason 
itself must have the required normative authority and force itself, such that it is imparted 
to the principles. To the further question of what justifies or confers upon reason this 
initial pull or force, we have already seen the answer. It is by virtue of the fact that the 
principles can be ‘universally adopted’, that is, it is by virtue of the public aspect of 
reason, that all can assent to it that reason gains its authority. 
 
The most basic requirement for construction by any plurality of agents must then 
be… no more than the requirement that any fundamental principles for thought 
and action we deploy be ones that it is not impossible for all to follow…Here we 
begin to understand why Kant held that the Categorical Imperative was the 




Note that on the surface, O’Neill’s account seems to look closer to Kant’s than Rawls’ at 
least at those moments when Kant is at pains to dissociate his moral philosophy from 
mere ‘practical anthropology’ (Gr 4:388), from ‘heteronomy’ in morals (Gr 4:441-5), 
from ‘eudaimonic’ grounds for morality (Gr 4:442-3, C.Pract.R., p.94/217) indeed, 
inclination generally (MM p.44/216), and instead ground morality ‘without going out of 
ourselves’ but rather, by means of ‘our own reason’ (C.Pract.R. p.112/238-9, see also, 
eg, p.32/143). Any one of such charges could be conceivably be levied against Rawls, 
since Rawls not only places the empirical desires of agents centre stage, but further, 
grounds the normative pull of the moral law within the social setting in which we find 
ourselves – and as O’Neill points out, it is indeed the social setting in which “we” find 
ourselves that ends up doing the work for Rawls’ Kant.  
Further, if successful, O’Neill’s account would steer clear of the sort of ‘obscure and 
panicky’ metaphysical claims (Constructions, p.210) which, as we saw, loom large over 
Kant’s actual account. For O’Neill, the constructive procedure would only need to invoke 
the limited rationality of agents such as we encounter within experience. This non-
metaphysical account would also appear to avoid the relativistic pitfalls of Rawls’ 
account, since the appeal is only to a minimal rationality, such that is designed to exclude 
socially constructed desires, and get to the bare core of agency. Thus, if successful, 
O’Neill’s account would avoid an excessive metaphysics, and also Ralws’ un-Kantian 
relativism, whilst maintaining the ‘immanence’ of the moral law with which Kant is 
concerned, at least in C.Pract.R. (p.50/164, p.112/238). 
 
It is important to note that there are tensions and questions intrinsic to O’Neill’s account. 
First, it might be suggested that O’Neill’s account of reason wrongly confuses the nature 
of reason with its consequences. Consider the following claim:  
 1) If something is rational, then anyone could assent to it. 
This much seems uncontroversial. Yet note that O’Neill surely invokes an inverted form 
of this claim in her procedural constructivist account: 
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 2) Rationality is constituted by the fact that anyone could assent to it. 
If 1) can be admitted to be a legitimate claim as to the nature of reason, then of 2), it 
could be commented that it mistakes the consequences of rational action for what 
constitutes rationality itself. Indeed, if it is uncontroversial, as I think it is, to admit that 
the former is a more common sense view of reason, then O’Neill’s adherence to 2) seems 
somewhat forced, if not confused. That is, O’Neill suggests that a proposition’s 
rationality is constructed and determined as a consequence of a particular procedure, and 
we might doubt that claim - perhaps the procedure is doing too much work here. 
 
Similarly, it might also be questioned whether O’Neill’s constructivism actually can 
deliver the strong normative force it claims to accommodate. At issue here is not the 
rationality of principles per se, but rather, the link between that rationality and the 
necessary normative pull or force that moral principles have on us. This normative pull 
could be accounted for in one of two ways: by virtue of some external authority, say, a 
lawgiver such as God, or by some internal authority. In typical constructivist style, the 
possibility of an external authority is to be rejected as a candidate for this authority. Thus, 
O’Neill’s constructivism looks to internal authority in an attempt to side step 
controversial metaphysical commitments. O’Neill’s next claim, indeed, her ‘big’ claim is 
that the only internal authority that seems plausible is the public use of reason.  
 
There is no lofty position above the debate, as perhaps there might be if human 
reason had a transcendent source. There is only the position of one who strives to 
reach and understand the perspectives of others, and to communicate with rather 
than past them  
(Constructions, p..46-7). 
 
Yet this is, by O’Neill’s own admission, merely a negative argument. ‘All that has been 
established for beings who share a world is that they cannot base this sharing on 
unadoptable reasons’ (Constructions p. 27, see also p.20, 22). The question then arises, 
since moral force seems necessary for her picture, is it not still incumbent upon O’Neill 
to offer a positive account of how public reason could generate the requisite sense of 
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normativity? Further, this seems particularly pressing, since without such an account we 
run the risk of simply conflating reason with whatever may happen to be popular enough 
to provide some guiding pull within the public realm. Unless such a distinction can be 
made, it seems that just about any principle could be granted the status of a moral 
principle, so long as it was suitably popular and were agreed to in accord with the public 
use of reason. But this surely comes at the cost of losing Kant’s distinction between 
hypothetical and categorical imperatives (Gr 4:414-5), indeed, even moral and non-moral 
principles (Gr 4:416), and that seems like precisely the sort of distinction that we want to 
keep, if we want to be faithful the way morality appears to us in experience. Kant is, I 
suggest, quite right to insist that the regardless of the metaphysics of the matter, there is 
just something unique about our moral experiences. As Kant puts it, ‘the categorical 
imperative alone has the tenor of a practical law’ (Gr 4:420 my emphasis). On Kant’s 
account, the mere fact that people can collectively decide to follow a given principle does 
not necessary make it moral, even if they decide to it under the constraints of public 
reason, since to follow some such principles may be to use certain means to secure ends, 
rather than to preserve ends in themselves. The distinction could be drawn in terms of a 
presumably non-moral decision to follow a principle that will lead to eg¸ playing a game 
of football and a decidedly moral decision to follow a principle that will eg, save a life. It 
is entirely conceivable that each principle could be constructed in accordance with the 
public use of reason and that neither relies on any external authority, and yet surely only 
one is moral. It seems then that that which ensures the link between reason and what 
Kant thinks of moral force may not be accommodated by O’Neill’s negative account of 
the link between public reason and normative force. That is, O’Neill’s account of 
normative force could do with some re-enforcement if it is to meet Kant’s awareness of 
the phenomenology of morality.  
 
In short then, whilst O’Neill seems closer to Kant than Rawls in consciously avoiding 
relativism, and more, her notion of minimal agency has important resonances of the 
‘reason model’ of morality attributed to Kant earlier, it might be thought that her account 
sees the constructive procedure doing too much work in creating or constituting the 
rationality of principles and propositions. More, her account of the normative pull of 
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Korsgaard too places great emphasis on the need to avoid ‘ontological or metaphysical 
commitments’ in moral philosophy (Creating the Kingdom of Ends (1996) hereafter, 
Creating, p.305n17). She shares with Rawls and O’Neill the view that value and 
normativity are not out there in the world to be intuited or discovered, but rather are 
generated and imposed upon the blind is of the world aside from experience by the 
exercise of rational agency. Korsgaard is clear - she takes this to be the only really 
legitimate position to hold, given the modern scientific worldview. 
 
If the real and the good are no longer one, value must find its way into the world 
somehow. Form must be imposed on the world of matter….The ethics of 
autonomy is the only one consistent with the metaphysics of the modern world 
(Sources of Normativity (1996), herafter, Sources, p.5) 
 
The stakes are high then, and Korsgaard’s account is more stringently constructivist than 
either Rawls’ or O’Neill’s. Korsgaard takes the constructivist discussion deeper, 
expanding the themes at play from the now familiar issues of whether and how value and 
subjective ends are accommodated within the framework of the blind is conception of the 
world aside from our experience, and looks beyond, to a key question central to any 
account that lays claim to the “Kantian” heritage, namely, given our admittedly finite 
standpoint and the prohibition on ‘metaphysical’ appeals to any external authority, can 
we save ‘absolute’ moral claims?  
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Korsgaard’s argument, roughly sketched, maintains that qua rational beings, we must 
have reasons for acting, that is, our practical activity is such that we act for reasons, not 
blindly. This model of rational agency itself presupposes that some actions are viewed as 
better than others, which in turn presupposes that we view some reasons as genuinely 
good reasons for acting. This requires regarding some reasons as corresponding to some 
genuinely good ends. Yet, to regard some ends as genuinely good, given that external 
authority is ruled out by the modern scientific worldview, requires that ‘we must regard 
ourselves as capable of  conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we 
set’ (Creating p.260).  The next stage of the argument maintains that it is only by virtue 
of regarding ourselves as having unconditional, or absolute value that we could conceive 
of transferring or conferring this value onto objects of our choice. That is, we must regard 
ourselves as capable of ensuring the judgement that something is genuinely good, and 
that this requires regarding ourselves as having an absolute value. Thus, in order to 
coherently conceive of our value-laden experience, we must regard ourselves as 
unconditionally valuable. Note then, that we must regard ourselves in this way because of 
our rational nature. Yet, if we regard ourselves as unconditionally valuable because of 
our rational nature, then we must also be committed to regarding other beings with an 
equally rational nature as possessing an equally unconditional value. Thus, our rational 
agency, that is, our practical activity in the world, entails a commitment to regarding all 
rational agents as unconditional ends in themselves. So on Korsgaard’s reading, we value 
rational agents unconditionally then not because of a fact about them that we intuit or 
recognize, but instead as a consequence of the commitments tacit in our conception of 
our own agency. 
This line of thought leads Korsgaard to the somewhat unexpected, indeed counter-
intuitive claim that the value of other people lies exclusively in something that I do. Thus 
Watkins and Fitzpatrick (2002) are right to raise Blackburn’s quasi-realist account of 
what we ordinarily think is wrong with slavery against Korsgaard. The thought is that it 
seems far more in line with our regular way of thinking about morality to say that slavery 
is wrong not because of any action of mine (assuming that I am not involved in the slave 
trade), but because there is just something straightforwardly wrong about another person 
having to experience something like that. To explain the wrongness of slavery by virtue 
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of some feature about myself seems to take a needless and distracting detour down the 
wrong path. Morality just does not seem that way to us in experience. 
To cash out the wrongness of such an action and its normative force for me in 
such a way that requires a detour through a story about what I have to do in order 
to exercise my will at all seems like a move precisely in the wrong direction. It 
does not seem true to ordinary moral experience, which certainly does not 
represent other people’s value and significance for us deriving from commitments 
bound up with the exercise of our own wills under certain generic constraints 
inherent in the nature of willing.  
(Watkins and Fitzpatrick (2002), p.361) 
 
We might say then that like O’Neill, Korgaard is faithful to the reason-heavy aspect of 
Kant’s moral thought, that she perhaps does a better job of accounting for the unique, 
‘absolute’ character of morality in experience, and more, that she is surely right do all 
this while leaving behind any appeal to thing in itself. Like O’Neill though, Korsgaard 
fails to capture something quite fundamental about the phenomenology of morality. 
O’Neill’s constructivism seems to mistake the rationality of principles for their 
constructed-ness, and also falls short of accommodating the strong normative force 
unique to the way morality strikes us. Whilst Korsgaard does offer an account of 
precisely this normative pull in her account of the uniquely absolute character of moral 
commands, she does so at the cost of some key commonsense intuitions about morality. 
This is particularly prescient in light of the question of staying faithful to a broadly-
conceived ‘Kantian’ ethics, since Kant himself is at pains to maintain our commonsense 
thoughts about morality. It is only thus that he can proceed ‘from common rational 
cognition to philosophy’ (Gr 4:413). As Kant asks so presciently asks, given the 
importance, and he thinks correctness, of our common appreciation of morality in 
experience: 
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Would it not therefore be more advisable in moral matters to leave the judgement 
of common reason as it is and, at most call in philosophy only to present the 
system of morals all the more completely and apprehensibly and to present its 
rules in a form more convenient for use (still more for disputation) but not to lead 
common human understanding away from its fortunate simplicity and to put it, by 
means of philosophy, on a new path of investigation and instruction? 
(Gr 4:404 my emphasis) 
 
§2:ii.i) Kant and Immediacy 
 
Central to each of the constructivist accounts is the importance of the subject’s 
deliberation, private or public, in moral actions and rational agency. The key idea that 
unites all the constructivist readings is that reason is the only reliable guarantor of the 
right action, and so the right thing to do must be worked out and consciously assented to 
by the subject. As we saw, for Rawls, this meant that moral principles and content could 
only be established through a specific constructivist procedure, for O’Neill, that such a 
procedure was rooted in the public use of reason, and for Korsgaard, that it is only by 
reflection on our rational agency that the unconditional value of others is coherent, given 
the modern scientific worldview. More, it was noted that this emphasis on reason as the 
basis of morality seemed to resonate with certain aspects of Kant’s own moral 
philosophy, namely the ‘reason model’ of morality discussed above. 
 
Yet in Gr, and in C.Pract.R especially, we are repeatedly reminded of the immediate 
nature of the moral law’s command over the will. This of course raises the question of 
why we should think that a constructivist picture requiring elaborate procedures and 
forms of deliberation could really be compatible with Kant’s actual moral thought. As we 
have already mentioned, Kant has a tendency to view common moral thought as broadly 
in the right place already. In the preface to Gr, Kant is quite clear that really, offering a 
philosophical account of the nature of morality is not as pressing a concern as a 
philosophical account of theoretical reason, since on the whole, people are pretty close to, 
and easily brought in line with, moral action. 
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Indeed there is really no other foundation for a metaphysics of morals that the 
critique of a pure practical reason, just as that of metaphysics is the critique of 
pure speculative reason, already published. But in the first place the former is not 
of such utmost necessity as the latter because in moral matters human reason can 
easily be brought to a high degree of correctness and accomplishment, even in the 
most common understanding 
(Gr, 4:391) 
 
Note then that Kant seems to have a very different conception to the constructivists of the 
‘state of play’ regarding moral philosophy. Kant tends to think that on the whole people 
just are more or less moral, and that their pre-philosophical thoughts and beliefs about 
morality are fine left as they are. It seems then that in contrast to the constructivists, Kant 
is not really concerned with ‘constructing’ moral norms at all. Rather, he views pre-
philosophical moral opinion as broadly in the right place, and the sort of problems he 
engages with arise specifically within the confines of philosophical investigation. That is, 
the philosophical question of the ultimate foundation of morality implies, for Kant, no 
revision of moral norms themselves, nor any revision of how they seem to us in 
experience, and I suggest, no prescriptive cannon of morally acceptable or prohibited 
acts. In contrast, procedural constructivists tend to start out from a position of general 
disagreement regarding the morally good life, and then literally ‘construct’ moral norms 
that provide a framework within which we can approve or condemn specific actions with 
the suitably justified moral authority of ‘right’ and ‘good’. For these constructivists then, 
it is precisely because the morally good act is not already clear to us from the get-go that 
we require some procedure. This means that only once we construct the procedure can we 
construct the parameters of moral goodness. Whereas Kant’s moral philosophy begins 
with the assumption that on the whole, people more or less already know what to do and 
how they ought to act, it is because they start from a position of ignorance regarding 
precisely these questions that procedural constructivisms like Rawls’ and O’Neill’s arise 
at all.  
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Further, I take it that it is by virtue of his acceptance of the immediacy of the moral law’s 
command over us that Kant thinks people more or less already know what to do.  
 
What I cognize immediately as a law for me I cognize with respect, which 
signifies merely consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law without 
the mediation of other influences on my sense. Immediate determination of my 
will by means of the law and consciousness of this is called respect, so that this is 
regarded as an effect of the law on the subject, and not as the cause of the law. 
(Gr, 4:401n) 
 
The implication of this passage is clearly in line with the stated aim of Gr, namely to 
identify the supreme principle of morality. What is not so clear from this passage though 
is where exactly anything like a constructivist picture of procedure fits into an 
explanation of moral action, such as was the concern of Rawls and O’Neill. Rather, for 
Kant, in moral action the will just is immediately determined by the moral law (hence the 
feeling of ‘respect’) and moral philosophy’s scope looks limited to more abstract 
questions regarding the limit and constitution of reason, theoretical and practical, an 
example of which is to settle to what extent form or content determines the will when its 
action is moral. Indeed, I suggest it is precisely this kind of thought about the descriptive 
role of moral philosophy that motivates Kant’s insistence at Gr 4:404 that in moral 
matters philosophy should leave things as they appear to the ‘fortunate simplicity’ of 
common moral cognition. The procedural constructivist claim that moral action only 
arises out the correct type of procedure thus seems quite foreign to Kant’s thought.  
 
The immediate determination of the will by the pure form of the moral law is also a 
prominent, repeated theme within C.Pract.R. spanning most of the work. 
 
 Reason, with its practical law, determines the will immediately 
 (C.Pract.R. p.24/133) 
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The practical rule is…unconditional, and hence it is conceived a priori as a 
categorically practical proposition by which the will is objectively determined 
absolutely and immediately (by the practical rule itself, which thus is in this case 
a law); for pure reason practical of itself is here directly legislative. 
(C.Pract.R. p.31/142) 
 
It is a sublime thing in human nature to be determined to actions immediately by a 
purely rational law; 
(C.Pract.R. p.125/255) 
 
…only when …respect has become active and dominant does it allow us by 
means of it a prospect into the world of the supersensible, and then only with 
weak glances; all this being so, there is room for true moral disposition, 
immediately devoted to the law 
(C.Pract.R. p.158/294-5) 
 
The centrality of this theme within C.Pract.R., namely that of the immediate character of 
the moral in human life, is likely related the reconceptualization of the objective reality of 
the moral law and freedom into a ‘fact’ of experience. Whilst this may go some way to 
explain the prevalence of the theme within Kant’s exegesis, it fails to help reconcile the 
notion with the procedural constructivist commentators. Such commentators insist that 
the conscious deliberation of rational agents actually generates the specifically moral 
content of principles. Yet on Kant’s conception of morality, agents are immediately 
determined by reason and philosophers arrive late to enquire abstractly as to the supreme 
principles underlying such an occurrence. Indeed, this aspect of Kant’s thought seems to 
imply a serious reconsideration of the ‘Kantian’ roots of constructivism. As Allen Wood 
puts it: 
 
If we are to understand properly the spirit of Kantian ethics…we must learn to ask 
far less of a “supreme principle of morality” than moral philosophers often ask. 
The function of a supreme principle of morality, then, is not to tell us directly, 
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from day to day and minute to minute, through some canonical process of moral 
reasoning to be applied exactly the same way to all situations, exactly which 
actions we should (and should not) be performing and precisely how we should be 
spending our time… The correct interpretation of Kant’s formulation of the 
supreme principle of morality exhibits the principle as concerned not with 
devising a “CI” decision procedure, or a ravishingly subtle and clever calculus but 
rather with stating the ultimate value on which moral rules and duties may be 
grounded. 
(Wood (2008) p.305-6). 
 
On such an interpretation then Kant’s moral philosophy seems quite distant from the 
project of ‘constructing’ a set of moral norms, and far to closer to Schopenhauer’s dictum 
that it would ‘be just as foolish to expect our moral systems and ethics would create 
virtuous, noble people, and holy men, as that our aesthetics would produce poets, 
painters, and musicians’, since ‘philosophy can never do more than interpret and explain 
what is present at hand’ (Schopenhauer (1958) p.271). With this in mind, it becomes 
clear just why Kant is so keen to include the notion of immediacy and, we might add, the 
unique, privilidged feel of morality and its pull that proves so troublesome for O’Neill 
and Korsgaard
14
. Kant’s aim is not to design an infallible procedure that generates the 
moral character of certain actions, still less to derive the definitive cannon of ‘morally 
approvable acts’. Rather, he takes moral phenomenology the way it is, immediate and 
unique, and works back from there to a derivation of the processes and fundamental 
rationality that must be in place. It is, I suggest, in this sense that we ought to understand 
Kantian ethics as fundamentally rooted in reason – the sense in which we examine the 
underlying rationality supporting our moral experience.  
 
The more procedural constructivisms of Rawls and O’Neill thus look significantly further 
away from Kant than Korsgaard, since her constructivism is rooted more squarely in a 
derivation of the principles underlying rational agency than in the importance of a 
                                                 
14
 Note, I am not here committing Kant to the position that morality is reducible to a feeling. Rather I am 
suggesting that Kant is well aware that morality has a unique feel about it when we encounter it in 
experience. 
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procedure for discerning which principles are properly moral. In this sense then 
Korsgaard may be thought the more legitimate heir to a broadly-conceived ‘Kantian’ 
ethical project rooted in an examination of human reason. Yet as we saw, Korsgaard too 
seems to miss something quite fundamental about the way morality appears to us. As the 
slavery example brings out so clearly, in the sense that her account is quite so obviously 
at odds with how we ordinarily think about morality, Korsgaard’s ordering of priorities 
within her moral theory seems decidedly un-Kantian. We may say then that Korsgaard 
too reveals her distance from Kant insofar as Kant himself is, as we have seen, concerned 
first and foremost to treat morality as we find it, and then to derive the principles that 
underlie it in such a way as to leave everything where it was before the inquiry began, 
such that the ‘fortunate simplicity’ of our moral experience remains undisturbed. 
 
§2.ii.ii) Kant and Conscience 
 
I have suggested that Kant’s moral philosophy is properly viewed as an analysis or 
derivation of morality, and one that strives to keep the feel of morality in experience 
intact, indeed untouched. The project of the ‘construction’ of moral content, or a position 
of moral authority, a space from which to praise or condemn with moral force thus looks 
quite distinct from Kant’s own position. Constructivists will of course object, suggesting 
that their project finds ample textual support from Kant’s moral works. Indeed, 
referencing Gr, Rawls reads Kant as providing a four step ‘categorical imperative 
procedure’ by which maxims can be ‘tested’ for their moral credentials, such that 
‘[u]nless a maxim passes the test of that procedure, acting from that maxim is forbidden’ 
(Themes p.82-7). O’Neill also quotes from Gr when she writes that ‘[t]he best-known 
version of [Kant’s] procedure of construction, the C[ategorical] I[mperative], is the 
formula of universal law, which enjoins agents to “act only in accordance with that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”: 
agents should reject principles of action which (they take it) cannot be adopted by all.’ 
(Freeman (ed) (2003) p.355). Once again Korsgaard seems closer to Kant than Rawls or 
O’Neill in correctly describing Kant’s project in Gr is ‘a motivational analysis’ (p.66). 
Yet she too reads Gr in the same prescriptive light as Rawls and O’Neill, suggesting that 
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‘Kant’s achievement is to argue from [a] feature of right actions to a substantive moral 
principle which identifies which actions are right’ (p.55) via a ‘universalizability test’ 
(p.66-72). This sort of reading has led to a caricature of Kant’s moral philosophy in 
which agents are urged to pause, think about whether the maxim of their proposed act is 
universalizable, and then either proceed or abstain according to the result of that ‘test’. 
Worse still, that universalization somehow makes moral content. More, I suggest that it is 
precisely on the back of this caricature of what Kant’s moral philosophy actually amounts 
to that constructivists regard themselves as ‘Kantian’ – it is in this procedural 
‘universalizability test’ that constructivists see their ‘Kantian’ roots. Given that I have 
suggested that this is not the conception of moral philosophy operative in Kant’s work, 
some account is required to put the constructivists right – Kant’s references to the 
formula of universal law need explaining in a way that frees him from this prescriptive 
baggage. 
 
I have suggested that a better position from which to read Kant’s moral philosophy is to 
understand him as starting with people’s pre-philosophical experience of morality and 
then analysing or deriving the underlying commitments that must be in place, given its 
unique, immediate character. On this conception the questions that Kant is concerned 
with arise not because moral norms need to be ‘constructed’ by a ‘test’ or ‘procedure’. 
Rather, Kant views agents as generally already knowing through common moral 
cognition what the moral law asks of them and they know this prior to any 
‘universalization test’. I suggest that Geiger’s understanding of the role of 
universalization within Kant’s moral thought as articulating ‘the shape of ordinary moral 
self-criticism’ (Geiger (2010) p.286) is particularly insightful here. Geiger’s claim is that 
Kant’s use of ‘universalization’ is ‘heuristic’ ((2010) p.286). Universalization serves to 
reinforce our common, pre-philosophical understanding of morality by bringing to the 
fore commitments that might otherwise be overridden by non-moral concerns such as 
crude self-interest. Universalization then serves to ‘bring an idea of reason closer to 
intuition (by a certain analogy) and thereby to feeling’ (Gr 4:436) by emphasizing and 
clarifying our pre-philosophical moral commitments. As Geiger puts it: ‘[b]y thus making 
the transgression perfectly vivid [universalization] provides a heuristic tool for moral 
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self-criticism…What the examples show is not the generation of new knowledge, but 
implicit knowledge made explicit…In this lies their heuristic value.’ ((2010) p.286). 
Universalization then offers a philosophical tool with which we can more fully 
understand the implied commitments of our pre-philosophical moral opinions. What 
universalization does not offer is the creation of moral content, still less a privileged 
position from which to judge and condemn. This reading finds ample textual 
accommodation, fitting neatly with Kant’s concern, noted above, to faithfully 
accommodate, and not corrupt, morality as we find it in experience - unique and 
immediate, not to mention his stated overall conception of the task of the moral 
philosopher as analysis or derivation of the fact of morality in experience (Gr 4:404-5; 
4:409), and his qualifications regarding the merely subjective necessity of 
universalization (‘Thus people say: If everyone permitted himself to deceive when he 
thought it to his advantage…’ (C,Pract.R. p.73/193 (my emphasis); see also Gr 4:412-4; 
436-7).  
 
With universalization thus conceived as giving philosophical voice to pre-philosophical 
moral commitments, Kant’s moral philosophy seems quite far from the prescriptive 
reading accorded to him by the constructivists. Insofar as Kant’s ethics is prescriptive at 
all, his recommendation seems to be that we ought to carefully examine our own pre-
philosophical commitments in order that we can recognize morality more clearly. In 
short, Kant’s moral project, thus conceived, amounts to a rigourous philosophical 
investigation into our common, immediate, pre-philosophical moral voice. It is then 
interesting to note that Kant’s mature thoughts on morality turn to the authority of 
conscience. 
 
In MM Kant tells us that ‘every man, as a moral being, has a conscience within him 
originally’ (MM p.202/400). Conscience, he tells us, ‘is an unavoidable fact’ (MM 
p.202/400). It is simply part of our moral phenomenology, described as ‘practical reason 
holding man’s duty before him for his acquittal or condemnation in every case that comes 
under a law’ (MM p.202/400), and later using his much-favoured legal analogies, 
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compared to ‘an internal court in man (“before which his thoughts accuse or excuse one 
other”)’ (MM p.233/438) and ‘the inner judge of all actions’ (MM p.234/439).  
 
Crucially, Kant accords conscience incredibly high status, commenting that ‘if someone 
is aware that he has acted in accordance with his conscience, then as far as guilt or 
innocence is concerned nothing more can be required of him’ (MM p.202/401). It seems 
then that quite the contrary to the claims of constructivists that Kant wants us to subject 
maxims to a ‘universalization test’, in fact, insofar as moral praise and blame are 
concerned, Kant seems content to ask simply whether an act was performed in good 
conscience. That is, conscience as ‘internal court’, the judge of all actions, makes no 
reference to universalization. Rather, the analogy of the court brings to the fore a more 
simple picture of accountability and responsibility to one’s own pre-philosophical 
conscience, and not the formulaic moral algebra the constructivists propose. More, there 
is an awareness of ignorance and fallibility at play in Kant’s thought that stands to 
distance him yet further from the constructivist emphasis on universalization.  
 
Kant is clear that ‘an erring conscience is an absurdity’ (MM p.202/400). Kant’s thought 
here seems to be that conscience cannot err in the sense that it might fail to pass 
judgement one way or the other. As Kant puts it, conscience ‘is not something that he 
himself (voluntarily) makes, but something incorporated into his being. It follows him 
like his shadow when he plans to escape’ (MM p.233/438). Yet though conscience cannot 
but pass judgement on what is and is not a duty, Kant admits that ‘I can indeed be 
mistaken at times in my objective judgement as to whether something is a duty or not’ 
(MM p.202/401). So conscience can err in the sense that it can mistake non-duties for 
duties. What it cannot err in is judging that something is a duty or not. Note though, that 
for Kant it seems that whether the maxim we are following is actually a duty is secondary 
in terms of moral praise and blame to whether or not the action is performed in 
conformity with conscience. Thus one ‘cannot be mistaken in my subjective judgement 
as to whether [they] have submitted it to my practical reason (here in its role as judge) for 
such a judgement’ (MM p.202/401) and ‘as far as guilt or innocence is concerned nothing 
more can be required of [agents]’ (MM p.202/401). Kant thus seems committed to the 
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position that ignorance and fallibility regarding the objective question of what my duties 
actually are do not bear on the moral praise or blame I deserve. Instead, since ‘nothing 
more can be required’ of an agent than ‘that he has acted in accordance with his 
conscience’ (MM p.202/401) it is ok, Kant thinks, to be wrong about the ultimate moral 
fact of the matter, so long as the action is assented to in good conscience. Far from 
devising a generative universalizing calculus for morality by which we judge the moral 
correctness of maxims, Kant seems committed to a far leaner prescriptive position than 
the constructivists maintain. 
 
Perhaps a little surprisingly, the prescriptive aspect of Kant’s mature ethics does not 
consist in the assertion of a duty to follow one’s conscience (MM p.202/401). Recall that 
conscience speaks to us so persistently, whether we like it or not, indeed even when we 
try to escape it, and more that conscience can get it wrong on the crucial question of 
discerning duties from non-duties. In this context it is perhaps understandable that rather 
than there being a duty to follow one’s conscience, instead there is Kant thinks, an 
undeniable obligation to take steps to inform ourselves and our conscience as best we can 
to the nature and character of our duties, in the hope that we get it wrong a little less. 
 
It is incumbent on him only to enlighten his understanding in the matter of what 
is and is not a duty… The duty here is only to cultivate one’s conscience, to 
sharpen one’s attentiveness to the voice of the inner judge and to use every 
means to obtain a hearing for it  
 (MM p.202/401) 
 
This, I suggest, is for Kant, the true ‘state of play’ for moral philosophy. On the whole 
people do not need much in the way of moral education – common pre-philosophical 
conscience has a ‘fortunate simplicity’ in its ability to guide us correctly. Nonetheless, 
experience is constituted by a plurality of voices and the heteronomous voice of the non-
moral can sometimes be mistaken for the autonomous voice of morality. To the extent 
that philosophy can help in moral matters, it can do so simply by investigating the 
distinct, indeed unique and immediate feel of, and perhaps also bring out some of the 
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implicit logic within that pre-philosophical ability to get it right, in the hope that perhaps 
our fallible conscience might err a little less. The constructivists mistake the complexity 
and sophistication of Kant’s analysis of our duties for a comprehensive, prescriptive 
project. In fact, Kant’s moral project is far more modest – he wants to accurately describe 
morality, so that we might be able to discern it a little better in the troublesome cases 
where conscience mistakes non-duties for duties.  
 
Ultimately though, Critical ignorance commits Kant to appreciating the wider irony of his 
moral project. At the most fundamental level, morality for Kant must always remain a 
mystery due to his unfortunate commitment to the unknowability of transcendental 
idealism’s thing in itself, and the examination of conscience is no exception. As Kant 
reminds us in an important footnote to a discussion of conscience: 
  
man as the subject of the moral lawgiving which proceeds from the concept of 
freedom and in which he is subject to a law that he gives himself (homo 
noumenon) is to be regarded as another (speciae diversus) from man as sensible 
being endowed with reason, though only in a practical aspect – for there is no 
theory about the causal relation of the intelligible to the sensible… Our reason 
cannot pursue further his power…in this function; we can only revere his 
unconditional iubeo or veto 
 (MM p.234n/439n). 
 
Ultimately, how conscience operates and the details of why it judges the way it does are 
unknowable. The best we can hope for from our enquiries into moral philosophy is that 
by some cosmic justice, the larger cosmic injustice of ignorance might, perhaps, be put 
right. But Kant must surely be committed to only ever viewing this possibility with, at 
best, a certain irony if he is to remain true to his Critical ignorance. At the most 
fundamental level, the workings of conscience must remain, for Kant, a mystery, and our 
efforts to enlighten it must remain, at best, a stab in the dark. Once again though, we 
notice that precisely that which Kant needs to get his moral project off the ground is 
modally distinct from the perspective of the thing in itself – namely, precisely that sense 
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of meaning which is unique to the human standpoint. Insofar as Kant’s analysis of 
conscience falls back on the familiarly problematic model of man qua unknowable 
noumenon mysteriously causing man qua phenomenon, it is unsatisfactory for all the 




§3: Fichte’s Ethics 
 
To recap, in chapter 1 it was suggested that the thing in itself, since modally distinct from 
intelligible entities, is ill-suited to Kant’s practical philosophy. With its inappropriateness 
for the task in mind, in chapter 2 some recent influential ‘constructivist’ attempts to form 
a broadly-conceived ‘Kantian’ ethics without the thing in itself were examined. It was 
there suggested that in ignoring Kant’s own concern to stay faithful to the 
phenomenology of our moral experiences, the constructivists misconceived Kant’s moral 
project. Rather than offering a generative principle of moral content, still less, 
constructing a position of moral authority, Kant’s moral project, it was suggested, is 
largely descriptive, though a prescriptive aspect was found in his discussion of the duty to 
‘enlighten’ one’s conscience. An implicit irony in Kant’s ethics was also noted. Since the 
ultimate fact of how and why conscience operates the way it does is a noumenal matter, 
we must remain open to the possibility that our efforts to reduce the misidentification of 
duty are ultimately futile. More, since Kant’s discussion of conscience falls back on his 
ill-conceived phenomena, thing in itself distinction, his account is problematic, since, as 
was suggested in chapter 1, the thing in itself is ill-suited to accommodating the 
intelligible entities necessary for morality – conscience included. 
 
In this final chapter I turn to Fichte’s ethics. Fichte’s thought is interesting in light of the 
preceding since he attempts not only to accommodate freedom without appealing to the 
thing in itself, he also strives to preserve much of the moral phenomenology central to 
Kant’s thought, but overlooked by the constructivists. Thus, Fichte’s ethics may be read 
as a critique of Kant’s insofar as his project meets Kant’s aims without invoking the thing 
in itself, yet closer to Kant than constructivism insofar as he remains true to our 
experience of morality and our pre-philosophical opinions. 
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§3:i) A non-thought 
 
Famously, Fichte rejects the thing in itself from his philosophy. Taken in isolation and at 
face value such a claim seems not simply bold, but appears to endorse a hopelessly 
ambitious metaphysical idealism which not only doubts, but rejects the existence of any 
thing external to one’s consciousness and in the past Fichte has been thought of as 
committed to the position that the mind somehow literally makes reality
15
. But this 
reading has been widely disputed more recently. Martin suggests that Fichte’s ‘exclusion 
of things in themselves is methodological rather than ontological’ (Martin (1997) p.66) 
and on the back of such a move, Ameriks suggests that the rejection of the thing in itself 
is ‘consistent with taking Fichte to have a robust belief in physical reality, very much as 
we ordinarily think of it’ ((2000) p.203). Sidestepping this somewhat vexed question of 
what ontology Fichte’s rejection of the thing in itself entails, for our purposes it suffices 
to say that regardless of Fichte’s ultimate ontological commitments, he is certainly 
committed to a blanket-ban on employing the thing in itself even in any hypothetically-
positive explanatory capacity. So, to take a pertinent example, Fichte agrees with Kant 
that freedom, and more, the distinct character of the intelligible, needs to be accounted 
for if morality is defended. Yet, given the blanket ban on the invocation of even any 
hypothetically-positive explanatory capacity, he cannot even say, as Kant does, that if 
freedom is possible, it is only possible from the viewpoint of the thing in itself. If Fichte 
is to defend freedom and the intelligible entities by his own strictures, the defence must 
remain entirely immanent. Anything else would be, by his own account, ‘a piece of 
whimsy, a pipe dream, a non-thought’ (Fichte, 1988, p.71/I, 17). 
 
Fichte’s reasons for excluding any positive explanatory potential for the thing in itself are 
varied. At times he suggests that the very idea of a thing in itself is a contradiction in 
terms – that it is ‘downright impossible’ to even think of a thing in itself ((1988, p.73, 
I,19). At other times, he invokes Cartesian skepticism suggesting ‘that we can never 
encounter anything independent of us, since everything is necessarily related to our 
                                                 
15
 See, eg Coplestone, F. (1965) From the Post Kantian Idealists to Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. Vol. 
7 of  A History of Philosophy 
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thinking’ (Introductions p.86/501), at other times he refers to as ‘a mere thought’ 
(Introductions p67-72/482-486) and ‘something produced by our own thinking’ 
(Introductions p.69/482). Clearly these different ways of referring to the thing in itself do 
not sit well together
16
 and recent commentators have paid most attention to Fichte’s 
criticism of the notion of our being ‘affected’ by the thing in itself. Since this sits closest 
to the criticism of the thing in itself outlined in chapter 1, it will be our focus. Fichte’s 
position here is that by Kant’s own admission, ‘the categories only apply only to what 
exists for us’ (Introductions p.67/482), and so to assume that causality, itself only made 
possible through the categories could extend beyond our experience and somehow link us 
up with something that exists not simply for us but in itself, is to misunderstand the 
parameters of causality within the Critical philosophy. As Fichte writes of those 
‘Kantians’ who assume this unjustifiable causal connection: ‘Their thing in itself…is 
supposed to have an effect upon the I! Have they forgotten what they themselves just said 
[?]’ (Introductions p.69/483). Fichte is acutely aware of the impossibility of causality 
applying beyond the scope of the categories, and so the very notion of a causally 
efficacious thing in itself is an unacceptable ‘combination of…dogmatism…with the 
most resolute idealism’ (Introductions p.69/483). Whilst this claim is admittedly distinct 
from that of chapter 1, which relied on a similar distinction, but focused more generally 
on the modal distinction between the sphere of human meaning and the thing in itself, the 
thoughts are very close to each other. What Fichte rules out is any sense in which the 
cause of our actions could, by Kant’s own system, conceivably lie in the thing in itself. 
His point is, I take it, that ‘thing’ only finds proper reference within human consciousness 
– that ‘thing’ requires the entire Kantian cognitive artifice. Within Fichte’s philosophy 
then,  ‘there is no talk whatsoever of any being, as being in itself; nor can there ever be 
any such talk…[since there is] being only for an intellect’ (Sittenlehre p.23/IV, 18). So 
Fichte must agree, given his position on causality, ‘being’ and the rest, that the viewpoint 
of the thing in itself is modally distinct from the locus of the intelligible, even if his 
discussion does not flesh out this claim in terms of meaning. 
 
                                                 
16
 As Martin has noted, the second type of claim seems to require a coherent, non-contradictory conception 
of the thing in itself ‘for a negative but substantive purpose: to state…epistemological implications…’ 
(Martin (1997), p.75-7). 
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§3:i.ii.i)Freedom without the thing in itself 
 
Like Kant, Fichte’s stated conception of what moral philosophy should aim for is, 
broadly, a description of the appearance of morality within experience. As Fichte puts it, 
‘ethics is the theory of our consciousness of our moral nature in general and of our 
specific duties in particular’ (System of Ethics hereafter Sittenlehre p.21/ IV, 15). That is, 
like Kant, Fichte does not think that morality needs to be argued for, or shown to exist – 
they both take the appearance of morality in experience as their starting point and work 
back from there to a derivation of its underlying factors. Also like Kant, Fichte is clear 
that insofar as the deduction is successful, it must leave morality the same as before the 
inquiry began.  
 
Just as one does not posit objects differently in space and time after one has 
obtained insight into the grounds of this operation… so does morality not 
manifest itself any differently in human beings after its deduction than before. 
(Sittenlehre p.21/IV, 15) 
 
More, like Kant, Fichte agrees that ‘[f]reedom is the absolute condition of all morality, 
and without it no morality whatsoever is possible’ (Sittenlehre p.221/IV, 232). Yet unlike 
Kant, as we saw above, Fichte cannot appeal positively to the thing in itself in his 
philosophy, and so unlike Kant, he must derive freedom without positively invoking the 
explanatory potential of the thing in itself.  
 
As we saw in chapter 1, in his moral philosophy, Kant often assumes that reason and the 
thing in itself are un-problematically interchangeable. That is, Kant indiscriminately (and 
unjustifiably) alternates between invoking a distinction between spatiotemporal 
appearances and the thing in itself on the one hand, and a distinction between 
spatiotemporal appearances and reason on the other. Speaking very broadly, like the 
constructivists (though in a thoroughly different tone and manner), having ditched the 
thing in itself, Fichte picks up on this second contrast, the ‘reason model’, distinguishing 
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the inert content of sensibility from the active, ‘self-sufficiency’ of reason, 
accommodating freedom in the latter.  
 
Fichte thinks we are conscious of our freedom through ‘intellectual intuition’ (Sittenlehre 
p.60/IV, 59). It is important to note that Fichte’s sense of ‘intellectual intuition’ is distinct 
from Kant’s. As we saw above, Kant uses the term ‘intellectual intuition’ in C.ofJ. §76 
when discussing the (for us impossible) gaze which intuits aside from the categorial 
cognitive artifice, and thereby also stripped of meaning, intelligibility and the rest. This is 
not how Fichte uses the term. Rather, for Fichte, intellectual intuition designates the form 
of consciousness’ self-reverting activity which Fichte thinks lies at the heart of all 
(properly-conceived) philosophy, is also the original form of both consciousness and the 
moral law, and demonstrates our freedom. 
 
In thinking about the thinking of a wall, Fichte suggests, the philosopher ascertains the 
division of consciousness into subject and object. In our pre-philosophical thinking of the 
wall as object, there is an unrecognized activity, namely, that of the subject doing the 
thinking, as distinct from the object being thought, the wall. That is, ‘the object that is 
being thought is not supposed to be the thinker itself’ (Sittnelehre p.24/IV, 19). The first 
job of philosophy then is to make this implicit distinction explicit, and bring to the fore 
the otherwise ‘lost’ activity of thinking itself. As Fichte puts it:  
 
A rational being … loses itself, as subject, in the object. In philosophy however, 
everything depends on becoming acquainted with the subject as such 
(Sittenlehre p.36/IV,31) 
  
This first form of consciousness in which subject and object are taken to be entirely 
distinct entities is then contrasted with the form of thinking about oneself. In this latter 
case, whilst the thinker is taken as ‘object’, in the sense that the thinker becomes the 
object of thought, here, the object being thought is supposed to be precisely the same as 
the thinker doing the thinking. That is, in thinking about the thinker, an admittedly 
artificial abstraction of the philosopher, one obtains a new concept, one entirely 
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unobtainable through the thinking of walls, namely, the concept of a fundamental unity of 
subject and object. Self-reverting cognitive activity thus yields new content. More, this 
new content is wrought of itself – in thinking about itself as both subject and object, 
consciousness provides itself with an otherwise un-encountered (and Fichte proposes that 
it is otherwise un-encounterable) concept of the fundamental unity of subject and object. 
This new concept Fichte calls the concept of I: 
 
when, in an act of thinking, the thinker and what is thought are taken to be the 
same and, vice versa, what arises in such an act of thinking is the concept of the I.   
(Sittenlehre p.24/IV, 18-9) 
 
Recall Kant’s definition of freedom in the Third Antinomy: ‘the faculty of beginning a 
state from itself, the causality of which does not in turn stand under another cause 
determining it in time in accordance with a law of nature’ (A533/B561). Fichte is aware 
that whilst this philosopher’s abstraction shows, at best, that this act of self-reverting 
consciousness demonstrates the beginning of a new state ‘from itself’, what he has not 
yet shown is that consciousness itself ‘does not in turn stand under another cause 
determining it in time with a law of nature’. At most, the philosopher’s intellectual 
intuition tells us that some thoughts find their locus entirely within consciousness, but the 
possibility remains that consciousness itself might yet be causally determined. It remains 
for Fichte to demonstrate that at the most fundamental level, consciousness itself follows 
this same form of beginning a state from itself, outside of the determined confines of 
time. This, of course would be to derive the freedom of consciousness, understood on 
Kantian terms.  
 
In his less philosophically extravagant moments, Fichte is happy to simply appeal to a 
very crude sense of intellectual intuition which, he maintains, makes clear to anyone 
capable of it that consciousness just is, at the fundamental level, a self-reverting activity, 
and that those incapable of experiencing this do not deserve a response (Introductions, 
p.20/434). At other, less vitriolic moments Fichte refers to the quality or character of 
consciousness and appeals to the inability of ‘being’ to account for such.  
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Fichte invites us to think of the impossible gaze of the primordial intellect – an intellect 
that has not ‘discovered’ the concept of I. That is just to say that Fichte invites us to 
consider the ‘I [that] is supposed to lie there and to have done so before it was grasped in 
intuition’ (Sittenlehre p.37/IV,32). Such an intellect, Fichte thinks, ‘remains a passive 
onlooker’, an ‘absolute force’ laying dormant (Sittenlehre p.37/IV,32).  We may say that 
such an intellect would be blind - there would be no consciousness of experience, no 
experience for us, and so, for Fichte, properly speaking, since experience requires the 
employment of the entire categorial artifice, no experience at all. Instead there would be 
simply a ‘being’ in the empty sense of the blind is.  
 
Effectively, Fichte’s big question then is: by virtue of what could a primordial intellect 
such as this be ‘elevated’ to consciousness such as we are acquainted with? Given that 
from Kant’s account, objects, space, time and the rest are possible only through the 
categories, and such a primordial intellect is pre-categorial, by what ability could this 
passive onlooker become a consciousness such as we would recognize? It cannot be by 
virtue of ‘things’ or ‘objects’ since these are posterior to this primordial intelligence. 
Consciousness is possible, Fichte suggests, only by virtue of the ability of the passive 
onlooker to actively double over and observe itself as observing. This, of course, is 
precisely that form of activity which was identified in the philosopher’s intellectual 
intuition, namely self-reverting activity, only now it has been proposed as the original 
form of consciousness per se. As Fichte puts it, it is only thus that ‘[e]yes are inserted 
into the unified one’ (Sittenlehre p.37n/IV,32n). Note then that for Fichte, the act by 
virtue of which the I intuits itself just is that by virtue of which it is a consciousness. 
 
 The I intuits itself purely and simply because it intuits itself 
 (Sittenlehre p.36/IV,32) 
 
If successful, Fichte’s account would accommodate precisely that sense of freedom 
which Kant located in the thing in itself, but without all the problematic baggage that we 
saw weighs down Kant’s noumenal appeals. That is, this primordial, pre-reflective 
intellect, as pre-categorial, is prior to time and space. Time and space, along with 
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causality and the rest, are nothing for it. Rather, only by virtue of its acting on itself does 
it find itself spatiotemporal. We may say then, that the self-reverting act is its first act, the 
act that gives rise to time and space, and all other consciousness. In this act, and only 
with this act are time and space ushered in to the picture. Thus time (to butcher Plato) is 
the moving image of blind indeterminacy becoming determinate consciousness, of the 
original absolute unity inserting its eyes into itself. In this sense, the act itself is its own 
beginning of time, and so is not itself preceded by temporal moments. To the extent that 
all consciousness begins with self-reverting activity then, it seems that the ‘timeless’ 
criterion set by the Third Antinomy has been met – all conscious agency has its original 
locus in a timeless, though non-noumenal beginning. More, as self-reverting act, the 
consciousness that ensues is the beginning of its own state. Thus, the ‘autonomy’ 
criterion is also met. 
 
 
§3:i.ii.ii) Practical Concerns 
 
Fichte understands that this kind of explanation is not going to convince everyone. It 
ultimately remains no more than a postulate of theoretical reason. Fichte himself is 
confident that the philosopher’s intellectual intuition identifies just that real initial 
intuition by which all consciousness is constituted. Indeed, for him it is clear that there 
simply are no other candidates, and so the case is closed. As he puts it: 
  
Is this original consciousness any different from the one that we, as philosophers 
have just produced within ourselves? How could it be, given that…the 
philosopher, as such, certainly possesses no other subjective form of thinking than 
that common and original form that is present in all reason? 
(Sittenlehre p.36/IV,31) 
  
Yet, Fichte admits that this is not enough. He has not demonstrated to the ultimate 
satisfaction of theoretical reason either that self-reverting activity is the fundamental 
characteristic of consciousness, or that we are transcendentally free. Freedom appears to 
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us a fact of experience, given eg the apparently free creation of the concept of an I 
yielded through the philosopher’s intellectual intuition. But Fichte is aware that an 
appearance of freedom is not, on its own enough for theoretical reason. In true Kantian 
style though, he adds that it is sufficient for practical reason.  
 
the appearance of freedom is an immediate fact of consciousness… [Yet] one 
might still wish to go further and could thereby transform it into an illusion. There 
is no theoretical reason for not doing this, but there is a practical one: namely, the 
firm resolve to grant primacy to practical reason, to hold the moral law to be the 
true and ultimate determination of our essence, and not to transform it into an 
illusion by sophistical reasoning 
(Sittenlehre p.56/IV,53-4) 
 
Recall Allison’s attempt to explain away the problems of Kant’s moral theory by 
appealing to practical reason’s ability to step into the ‘vacant space’ where theoretical 
reason met its tether. It was noted that this move missed the modal distinctness of the 
intelligible and the thing in itself, and so was subject to all the familiar criticisms of 
Kant’s project. Yet here, note that when Fichte invokes the primacy of practical reason, 
and more, its ability to fill the empty space of theoretical reason’s impasse, there is no 
modal distinction at play. Rather, freedom and the intelligible are rooted entirely within 
human experience. Thus, for Fichte, the problems inherent to Kant’s invocation of the 
primacy of the practical that we saw above fail to apply.  
 
Note also that practical reason steps into play just when there is an awareness of self-
reverting activity. Whilst, as Fichte admits, sophistical theoretical postulates can be put 
forward doubting its ultimate origin, for practical reason, the awareness of self-reverting 
activity just is the awareness of our freedom. It is in this sense then, that Fichte comments 
‘this derivation makes comprehensible the so-called categorical imperative’ (Sittenlehre 
p.52/IV,50). Insofar as we take ourselves to be free in our activity, we do so by the law 
we set ourselves – that we will not go beyond the appearance of freedom, ‘which thereby 
becomes for us the truth’ (Sittenlehre p.56/IV,54). That is, the very form of 
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consciousness as a self-reverting activity is that of an ‘ought’. It is through this awareness 
of the fundamentally normative structure of consciousness that the I is an I. To observe 
oneself as subject in distinction from an object is to notice oneself as bound. It is to think 
of one’s free activity under a law, and a law that one gives oneself. Thus, at the heart of 
consciousness lies the categorical imperative, a normative law one gives oneself to be 
autonomous.  
 
If a rational being thinks of itself as self-sufficient…then it necessarily thinks of 
itself  as free, and – this is what really matters here – it thinks this freedom under 





To recap then, Fichte attempts to accommodate freedom precisely within the human 
sphere of meaning from which it had been exiled by Kant. Fichte roots freedom in our 
conception of ourselves as rational agents, and construes the fundamental form of 
rationality as normatively loaded. Yet, in explaining morality by appealing exclusively 
from the conditions of rational agency, might Fichte not fall prey to sorts of concerns 
about a contorted moral phenomology, such as were raised against Korsgaard? Fichte 
thinks that his incorporation of intersubjectivity into his account of individuality will put 
this concern right. 
 
In the “Second Introduction” Fichte complains that his use of the first-person pronoun 
(and its negation) has led to grave misunderstandings about the scope of the 
Wissenschaftslehre’s claims heretofore. He specifies that the I of the Wissenschaftslehre 
elucidated above, refers only to the most fundamental structure of subjectivity as taking 
the form subject/object, and that this elucidates only the ‘conditions for all 
consciousness’ (Introductions p.61). The subject/object partition of consciousness refers 
to the mere form of consciousness per se (I-hood), and as such, the formal I identified in 
the concept of an I is not to be mistaken for the fully conscious individual. 
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the I with which the Wissenschaftslehre commences…contains nothing but the 
form of I-hood, [ie] self-reverting activity…[which] is not thought of as an 
individual, because I-hood has not yet been determined as individuality 
(Introductions p.100). 
 
In Foundations of Natural Right (herafter FNR) Fichte addresses the place of 
consciousness of one’s individuality within the Wissenschaftslehre, and maintains the 
necessity of intersubjectivity for any such judgement. The deduction in FNR begins by 
rehearsing the deduction of abstract I-hood, here succinctly summarised: Self-reverting 
act: A, determines its own self as object: B, only by virtue of positing some opposed, 
limiting object(s): C (FNR p.18-9). But it is specified at the very beginning that here the 
deduction will culminate with the demonstration of the ‘finite rational being’ (FNR p.18). 
Thus, the deduction of the empirical individual in FNR begins with, and builds upon, the 
deduction of the formal I. 
 
The second stage of the deduction flags up an apparent problem for the preceding tri-
partite model of the awareness of rational activity. Since this model maintains that 
awareness of rational activity requires an object to be comprehended as constraining the 
subject’s activity, ie as standing in opposition to and limiting the activity of the subject, 
then it appears that awareness of rational activity has been achieved only by sacrificing 
the subject’s free activity. But of course this cannot be the case, since the object itself ‘is 
supposed to be the subject’s own efficacy’ (FNR p.31). How could it be that the subject is 
both freely acting, and yet constrained or determined by an object? Thus we are presented 
‘with a complete contradiction’ (FNR p.31). 
 
Fichte’s proposed solution to the apparent contradiction is to dissolve the problem by 
reconceptualising the problematic determination as self-determination, born as a response 
to an invitation to be self-efficacious. Thus, the contradiction is dissolved ‘if we think of 
the subject’s being-determined as its being-determined to be self-determining i.e., as a 
summons [eine Aufforderung] to the subject, calling upon it to resolve to exercise its 
efficacy’ (FNR p.31).  
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Note that this alone does not necessarily solve, or dissolve the problem of the 
simultaneity of freedom and determination. If the summons is conceived as an imperative 
or order, ie as the sort of call to which one cannot say no, then the problem remains, as 
the contradiction between determination and free efficacy still persists. 
 
Fichte then discusses the necessity of the summons as comprehended, or posited as 
‘given to it from the outside’ (FNR p.32) confining the investigation only to how the 
summons ‘must appear to the subject under investigation’ and not to a consideration of it 
‘from the transcendental view’ (FNR p.34). The summons must, at the empirical level, be 
experienced as an external influence on the original ‘sheer activity’ by calling it to be 
self-reverting in character.  
 
The next stage of the deduction establishes that due to the purposive character of the 
summons itself, ‘the cause of the summons must itself necessarily posses the concept of 
reason and freedom’ which is just to say that ‘it must be an intelligence…and thus a 
rational being, and must be posited as such’ (FNR p.35). With this step the 
aforementioned concern about the summons not necessarily dissolving the contradiction 
of free efficacy and determination is supposedly relieved. As a summons from a rational 
individual the subject is free to accept or decline the invitation to act as a free rational 
being (FNR p.33), though of course, even the decision to decline would be to exercise 
one’s free choice, and as such, the realisation of one’s individuality is inevitable, given 
that the summons originates from another rational individual. Thus the deduction is 
complete. Responding to the summons of another rational agent is necessary in order for 
me to actualise my own, otherwise latent capacity for full-blown consciousness of 
myself.  
 
If successful, Fichte has derived the necessity of intersubjectivity as a condition for 
consciousness of individuality. Thus, our moral acting in the world would be posterior to 
a genuine interaction with other rational beings. Insofar as we are moral then, we have 
been summoned to do so by a rational agent. As such, we might think that Fichte, in 
incorporating intersubjectivity as a condition for moral acting in the world might sidestep 
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most of the blow accorded to Korsgaard’s account. That is, since interaction with other 
rational beings is required as a pre-cursor for moral actions, perhaps his ethics, though 
rooted in rational agency might escape the charge of being too subject-oriented in its 
conception of morality. What is wrong about slavery for Korsgaard is something about 
my rationality, whereas what is wrong about slavery for Fichte must find its explanation 
in an actually experienced shared awareness of us as rational agents. I suggest though that 
things might not be so straight forward for Fichte. For Fichte, the conceptual bedrock of 
the formal I’s counterpositing upon which intersubjectivity is based ensures that the 
encounter with the rational other in conscious experience is reducible to an instance of 
the counterpositing of subject/object concepts within the subject. In order for there to be 
any experience of rational beings, on Fichte’s model there must be a foundational 
consciousness, mere I-hood. That is, ultimately, the experience of the other rational 
individual must, for Fichte, be reducible to a complex conceptual relation, itself a mere 
fleshing out of the primitive concept of the general ‘object’ (Not-I). Thus, far from 
experiencing the other in their immediacy, for Fichte, it seems the other is always 
experienced at a conceptual remove, as a projection or comprehension of my subjectivity 
as the other. We might say that Fichte remains committed to a subjective 
intersubjectivity, and that thus, what it wrong about slavery, for Fichte as for  Korsgaard 
finds its ultimate explanation in a fact about my own rationality. 
 
§3:iv) Fichte and Conscience 
 
It was noted above that conscience seems to play more than a passing role in Kant’s own 
moral thought, and that this presented an obstacle to the constructivists’ emphasis on 
procedure. Further, it was noted that Kant himself emphasizes the importance of listening 
to one’s conscience and our ‘duty’ to strive to ensure it is informed or enlightened within 
his own moral philosophy. Similarly, Fichte suggests that the command ‘Act according to 
your conscience’ is the ‘formal condition for the morality of our actions’. So morality is, 
as much for Fichte as Kant, intricately tied to conscience. Of course the most pressing 
objection to this line of thought is that surely people are often mistaken in their 
convictions regarding their duties. Indeed, as we saw, this was the motivation for Kant’s 
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discussion of the duty to inform one’s conscience as best we can. It was also noted 
however, that given Critical ignorance, Kant must be committed to a certain irony within 
his moral theory – the steps we take to inform conscience may amount to nothing, given 
the ultimate noumenal grounds of conscience.  
 
To this, Fichte replies that such thought can be taken as an objection to the authority of 
conscience. Yet, the objection can be admitted only insofar as it could also be admitted 
that there is ‘no absolute criterion for the correctness of my conviction concerning my 
duty’ (Sittenlehre p.156/164). If such an absolute benchmark for certainty regarding one’s 
conviction could be identified, then the objection would fall. Note then that where Kant is 
resigned to a position of Critical ignorance regarding conscience – there is no ultimate 
assurance that conscience will get it right, due to his unfortunate commitment to its 
ultimate noumenal source – for Fichte, with the thing in itself out of the picture, the 
ground is cleared for a defence of conscience. 
 
Fichte’s argument for the absolute criterion for such correctness begins with the 
observation that the moral law demands a certain determinate conviction. That is to say, 
the moral law does not issue in vague terms, but rather commands specific actions or 
abstentions to be performed for specific reasons, examples of which can be found in 
Kant’s discussions of the potential suicide case at Gr 4:422, or the man asked to bear 
false witness or face execution at C.Pract.R. p.30-1/141. As Fichte presciently points out 
though, a conviction is simply a particular kind of cognition held by rational agents. But 
the moral law itself is not a cognitive faculty. Thus the moral law is not itself a ‘power of 
cognition, and therefore by virtue of its very essence it cannot produce this conviction by 
itself’ (Sittenlehre p.157/165). Recall that Kant himself is at pains to distinguish, indeed 
even distance the theoretical from the practical, though perhaps he might not agree with 
Fichte that ‘the practical power is not a theoretical power’ (Sittenlehre p.157/165). 
Nonetheless, Fichte claims that insofar as a conviction can only arise via cognition, and 
the moral law demands a certain conviction, the moral law must be, in some way, related 
to the theoretical, cognitive power, which Fichte here calls, ‘the power of reflective 
judgement’ (Sittenlehre p.157/165).  
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For Fichte, the manner in which the moral law and reflective judgement are related 
follows from Kant’s well-known stance regarding the strictly formal character of the 
moral law. If the moral law is only formal, then whilst it can surely establish the 
condition of an action or conviction, something else must be invoked to establish what 
content is to be conditioned (see Sittenlehre p.145, 155/153, 163). So whilst the moral 
law determines the form of the conviction, reflective judgement must search for the 
appropriate matter or content, such that just this determinate conviction can be actualized 
in experience.  
 
It is important to note here that reflective judgement’s searching is itself a free act. As 
Fichte puts the point, ‘[a]s long as the power of judgement continues to search, the free 
power of imagination continues to hover between opposites’ (Sittenlehre p.159/167). To 
elaborate on this admittedly cryptic remark, Fichte expresses consciousness of the 
freedom of the self, qua formal I, as a consciousness of ‘my transition from 
indeterminacy to determinacy’ (Sittenlehre p.130/136). The basic thought is, as we have 
seen, that any determinate object of thought, since it is determinate, is fixed down, and so 
stands in opposition to the free activity of the self (Introductions p.116). Thus, 
consciousness of my transition from indeterminacy to determinacy is at least a condition 
for consciousness of myself as, in some sense, that which does the determining whenever 
there are determinate thoughts (Sittenlehre p.131/138). Yet indeterminacy cannot be 
coherently conceived of as any one specific instance of ‘not-determinacy’. That is, for 
Fichte, it is simply wrong to conceive of indeterminacy as any determinate ‘¬x’. Instead, 
Fichte conceives of the indeterminacy of the self as the imagination’s original, that is, 
pre-conscious ‘undecided hovering between several possible determinations’ (Sittenlehre 
p.131/138). Of course, once we actually do think of this or that object of thought, such an 
object of thought will inevitably be determinate, and thus opposed to the free activity of 
the self. Yet since any determinate thought could have conceivably been otherwise, 
freedom, qua indeterminate hovering, ‘will always be the cause’ (Sittenlehre  p.131/138). 
Regarding the formal determination of conviction by the moral law then, once reflective 
judgement gets going with the search for the appropriate material, ‘the theoretical powers 
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persue their own course until they hit upon something that can be approved’ (Sittenlehre 
p.157/166 my emphasis). The idea is that whilst the form is determined entirely by the 
moral law, indeed, that the moral law in some sense sets the imagination off hovering in 
the first place, the hovering of the imagination is itself a free action, even if such free 
hovering culminates in the ensuing determination of the material. This is important, since 
it cements the Kantian link between morality and freedom for Fichte, which in turn 
entitles him to reject any and all forms of reliance on external authority in moral matters 
(Sittenlehre p.168/176-7). Further though, such a move accommodates freedom for the 
formal I even if the empirical I is determined by the moral law and also helps to explain 
how the action could be conceived of as mine yet subject to determination by the moral 
law. It is the (formal) I that does the free hovering, even if the end result is a determinate, 
immediate fact to which the (empirical) I is bound.  
 
Returning to the derivation of the absolute criterion for the correctness of one’s 
conviction regarding duty, we have seen already that even if the moral law determines the 
form the conviction will take, the power of reflective judgement freely searches for the 
fitting material so that just this dutiful conviction can be actualized. When, or rather if, 
reflective judgement does find some fitting candidate, then the moral law and theoretical 
judgement are brought into harmony with each other. Since this results in a determinate 
duty in experience, the formal I and the empirical I too are brought into harmony with 
each other, since the free activity of the former is manifested in the empirical activity of 
the latter; namely, the performance of the moral act. ‘[T]he original I and the actual I will 
now be in harmony’ (Sittenlehre p.158/166-7).  
 
It is important to note here the parallel between Fichte’s choice of the terms ‘reflective 
judgement’ and Kant’s thoughts on reflective judgement in C.ofJ. I take it that the idea is 
that the harmony in the experience of the moral law and the theoretical power of 
imagination’s free hovering is importantly similar to an aesthetic experience – once 
harmony is achieved, there is a ‘repose’, and a state of ‘peace’ (Sittenlehre p.140/147). 
Note though that this peaceful repose is to be distinguished from an aesthetic experience 
in that no pleasure is gained by it. Instead, this ‘cold approval’ is merely experienced as a 
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‘feeling of harmony’ (p.159/167). Yet as with aesthetic experience, which we experience 
immediately, though only by virtue of the interplay of sensibility and understanding 
brought to the fore by transcendental inquiry, similarly here, what has been derived at the 
transcendental level as the reciprocal interaction of the moral law or practical power with 
reflective judgement or theoretical power, is felt in experience as an ‘immediate 
certainty’ (Sittenlehre p.159/168). As soon as the relevant material is found by reflective 
judgement, then ‘constraint is present’ and we, as empirical subjects are determined by 
the law to form some determinate conviction. 
 
As soon as the power of judgement finds what was demanded, the fact that this is 
indeed what was commanded reveals itself through a feeling of harmony…I 
cannot view this matter in any way other than in the way I do view it: constraint is 
present, as it is in the case of every feeling. This feeling provides cognition with 
immediate certainty, with which calm and satisfaction are connected. 
(Sittenlehrep.159/168-9) 
 
it is not by means of argumentation that I know whether I am in doubt or 
certain…instead, this is something I know only through immediate feeling. Only 
in this way can we explain subjective certainty as a state of mind. The feeling of 
certainty, however, is always an immediate harmony of our consciousness with 




This immediate certainty about our determinate duty, which is, for Fichte, necessarily 
non-discursive, but rather felt, is just what he means by ‘conscience’. ‘Conscience is … 
the immediate consciousness of our duty’ (Sittenlehre p.164/173). It is precisely this 
feeling of immediate certainty that he thinks provides the absolute criterion for the 
correctness of conviction regarding duty that we started with. We know it is our duty 
because we experience the harmony of freely reflective judgement and the moral law in 
our empirical experience of the world, and we experience it as an immediate non-
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conceptual feeling that we need look no further for the right thing to do – it is simply 
immediately clear to us that we ought to act in just this way at just this moment. Note 
though, that although our determinate duty is immediately certain to us in experience, it is 
premised on the free acting of the imagination. That is, once given, or found, the 
consciousness that just this material ‘x’ is the content of my duty, is immediately certain. 
Yet the material itself is found only through my act of freely reflective thought, a 
hovering between indeterminacies. Thus, for Fichte, whilst the morally right action is 
immediately and unavoidably felt by one’s conscience, it does not originate in one’s 
conscience, but rather in one’s own freedom. Whilst the empirical I cannot but feel the 
determination of its conviction by the moral law in conscience, that the moral law is 
efficacious on his conscience is only possible as a consequence of the exercise of the 
formal I’s free activity. So while the empirical I feels the command of the moral law 
immediately, the attribution of freedom to the formal I enables a reconciliation of the two 




In his Problems of Moral Philosophy Adorno comments: 
 
if we wished to summarize the distinction between Kant and Fichte and all 
succeeding idealists in a single gesture it would be this moment of rupture, the 
moment when Kant says, ‘This need not concern us’, that they were unable 
stomach. And what they said was, ‘What you have said about this being of no 
concern to us is precisely what concerns us most.’ 
 (Adorno (2001) p.95) 
 
As I hope to have shown, this remark seems, in any ways, an apt description of Fichte’s 
moral project. Where Kant tells us that freedom must remain unknowable, Fichte derives 
an account of freedom. Where Kant tells us we cannot know how conscience operates, 
Fichte offers a derivation of conscience. Yet, Fichte’s moral philosophy is unlikely to 
find adherents. At best we may say that his account of conscience is coherent, given his 
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other commitments. At worst, we might view it as among the worst forms of speculative 
excess. More, his account of the intersubjective nature of individuality, and thereby also 
the intersubjective element underlying all our moral consciousness, is, I suggest a failure. 
Fichte’s account is plagued here by the all-pervading account of foundational 
consciousness, so that the other always remains at best a ‘posited’ rational being. Yet, I 
suggest that Ficthe’s account of freedom is, by Kantian strictures, a success. He manages 
to reconcile freedom with the sphere of human experience and meaning in a way that 
Kant never could, indeed, in conscious awareness of the limitations of the Kantian 
system’s use of the thing in itself. More, though his account of conscience is, I suggest, 
unconvincing, Fichte’s insistence that ‘pay[ing] attention to the dictates of one’s 
conscience… is sufficient for engendering both a dutiful disposition and dutiful conduct’ 
(Sittenlehre p.20/IV,14) places him firmly on the same page as Kant with regard the 
‘state of play’ of morality both in experience, and within philosophy. Both Kant and 
Fichte share the thought that ordinary, pre-philosophical reasoning needs little by way 
moral education. More, they share the thought that philosophy ought to remain true to 
this awareness. Fichte’s failures then, are explicable by their proximity to the central 
themes of Kant’s project. His success though is a tribute to his keen awareness of the 
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